display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Substances can survive a change in their parts in a way that a mere aggregate of parts. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: A simple but very important idea. If we then distinguish between 'substances' and 'aggregates' we get a much clearer grip on things. Is the Ship of Theseus a substance or an aggregate? There is no factual answer to that. What do you want to explain? |
14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Thermostats, thermometers, axes, spoons, and batteries have dispositional essences, which make them what they are. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 01.2 iv) | |
A reaction: I would have thought that we could extend this proposal well beyond artefacts, but it certainly seems particularly clear in artefacts, where a human intention seems to be inescapably involved. |
12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Essentialists fail to show how we ascend from being a property universally possessed, by all kind members, to the status of being an essential property. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.5) | |
A reaction: This is precisely where my proposal comes in - the essential properties, as opposed to the accidentaly universals, are those which explain the nature and behaviour of each kind of thing (and each individual thing). |