Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Timothy Williamson and Judith (Jarvis) Thomson

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6 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

6861	What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
	Full Idea: The problem of vagueness is the problem of what logic is correct for vague concepts, and correspondingly what notions of truth and falsity are applicable to vague statements (does one need a continuum of degrees of truth, for example?).
	From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.153)
	A reaction: This certainly makes vagueness sound like one of the most interesting problems in all of philosophy, though also one of the most difficult. Williamson's solution is that we may be vague, but the world isn't.

9602	Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
	Full Idea: The constraints of common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness.
	From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After)
	A reaction: Wiliamson has described himself (in my hearing) as a 'rottweiller realist', but presumably the problem of vagueness interests a lot of people precisely because it pushes us away from common sense and classical logic.

21630	If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson]
	Full Idea: If objects can have fuzzy spatial boundaries, surely they can have fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries too.
	From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 9.2)
	A reaction: Fair point. I think there is a distinction between parts of the thing, such as its edges, being fuzzy, and the whole thing being fuzzy, in the temporal case.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

13267	Temporal parts is a crazy doctrine, because it entails constantly creating stuff ex nihilo [Thomson, by Koslicki]
	Full Idea: Thomson famously objects that the doctrine of temporal parts is 'a crazy metaphysic - obviously false', since it entails that material objects are constantly being generated ex nihilo (or, at least, the stuff of which they are composed is).
	From: report of Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (Parthood and Identity across Time [1983], p.210) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 2.2
	A reaction: The related objections are to ask what the temporal 'width' of a part is, and whether the joins are visible.

16209	How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson]
	Full Idea: Can one really think that point-duration temporal slices of bodies believe things or want things?
	From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (People and Their Bodies [1997], p.211), quoted by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 2.9 n21
	A reaction: There is a problem with a slice doing anything long-term. The bottom line is that things are said to 'endure', but that is precisely what time-slices are unable to do. Hawley rejects this idea.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers

21632	A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson]
	Full Idea: A river is not just an event. One would need to specify counterfactual as well as actual boundaries.
	From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 9.3)
	A reaction: In other words the same river can change its course a bit, but it can't head off in the opposite direction.