display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
| 16620 | A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can be compounded of matter and form. The matter of a chair is wood; the form is the figure it has, apt for the intended use. Does his Lordship think the chair compounded of the wood and the figure? | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:302), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle does use the word 'shape' [morphe] when he is discussing hylomorphism, and the statue example seems to support it, but elsewhere the form is a much deeper principle of individuation. |
| 10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
| Full Idea: It would be natural to label one extreme view 'maximal essentialism' - that all of an object's properties are essential - and the other extreme 'minimal' - that only trivial properties such as self-identity of being either F or not-F are essential. | |
| From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008]) | |
| A reaction: Personally I don't accept the trivial ones as being in any way describable as 'properties'. The maximal view destroys any useful notion of essence. Leibniz is a minority holder of the maximal view. I would defend a middle way. |
| 16790 | A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: A body is always the same, whether the parts of it be put together or dispersed; or whether it be congealed or dissolved. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
| A reaction: This appears to be a commitment by Hobbes to what we now call 'classical' mereology - that any bunch of things can count as a whole, whether they are together or dispersed. He seems to mean more than a watch surviving dismantling. |
| 17244 | To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: In composition, it is to be understood that for the making up of a whole there is no need of putting the parts together, so as to make them touch one another, but only of collecting them into one sum in the mind. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.07.08) | |
| A reaction: This seems to the 'unrestricted composition' of classical mereology, since it appears that Hobbes offers no restriction on which parts can be united by a mind, no matter how bizarre. |