display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: It may well be that the only way we have, ultimately, of individuating anything is to relate it uniquely to ourselves. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I'm guessing that Chisholm is thinking of 'ourselves' as meaning just himself, but I'm thinking this is plausible if he means the human community. I doubt whether there is much a philosopher can say on individuation that is revealing or precise. |
15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Being the tallest man and being President of the United States are 'individual concepts', but not haecceities. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Chisholm introduces this term, to help him explain his haecceity more clearly. (His proposal on that adds a lot of fog to this area of metaphysics). |
15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: An individual essence or haecceity is a narrower type of individual concept. This is a property which is had necessarily, and which it is impossible for any other thing to have. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [Apologies to Chisholm for leaving out the variables from his definition of haecceity. See Idea 15802] See also Idea 15805. The tallest man is unique, but someone else could become the tallest man. No one else could acquire 'being Socrates'. |