Combining Philosophers

Ideas for John Buridan, Charles Sanders Peirce and Hecato

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

14797	Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Logicians have too much neglected the study of vagueness, not suspecting the important part it plays in mathematical thought. It is the antithetical analogue of generality.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Critical Common-Sensism [1905], I)

14798	All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The 'vague' might be defined as that to which the principle of contradiction does not apply. For it is false neither that an animal (in a vague sense) is male, nor that an animal is female. No communication between persons can be entirely non-vague.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Critical Common-Sensism [1905], I)
	A reaction: Note that he makes vagueness largely a matter of the way we talk, which is David Lewis's approach, and looks right to me.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object

16678	Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
	Full Idea: If magnitude were removed from matter by divine power, it would still have parts distinct from one another, but they would not be positioned either outside one another or inside one another, because position would be removed.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.8 f. 11va), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4
	A reaction: This shows why Quantity is such an important category for scholastic philosopher.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers

16793	A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
	Full Idea: Less properly, one thing is said to be numerically the same as another according to the continuity of distinct parts, one in succession after another. In this way the Seine is said to be the same river after a thousand years.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.10, f. 13vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.3
	A reaction: This is a rather good solution to the difficulty of the looser non-transitive notion of a thing being 'the same'. The Ship of Theseus endures (in the simple case) as long as you remember to replace each departing plank. Must some parts be originals?