display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
7 ideas
14524 | Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Epicurus said that body was conceived as an aggregate of shape and size and resistance and weight. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.257] Note that this is how we 'conceive' them. They might be intrinsically different, except that Epicurus is pretty much a phenomenalist. |
14046 | A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Properties are known by their peculiar forms of application and comprehension, in close accompaniment with the aggregate [of atoms], which is given the predicate 'body' by reference to the aggregate conception. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 69) | |
A reaction: There is an interesting hint here of how to think of properties (as both applying and comprehended in some distinctive way), and a suggestion that there is something conventional about bodies, depending on how we conceive them. |
4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
Full Idea: Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances). | |
From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76) | |
A reaction: Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers? |
14542 | If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined [Mumford/Anjum] |
Full Idea: If both the statue and the clay fall on someone and crush them to death, we would not say that the death is overdetermined. | |
From: S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 2.7) | |
A reaction: I don't need many reasons to give up the idea that the statue and the clay are two objects, but this will do nicely as one of them. |
14535 | Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
Full Idea: A pandispositionalist has to defend the view that even a property such as sphericity is in reality a cluster of causal powers. | |
From: S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Is sphericity even a 'property'? I think 'feature' might be the best word for it. 'Quality' is quite good, but is too suggestive of qualia and secondary qualities. 'Mode' is not bad. Things have 'modes of existence' and 'powers'? Powers create modes. |
14047 | Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Impermanent properties do not have the nature of an entire thing, which we call a body when we grasp it in aggregate, nor the nature of permanent accompaniments without which it is not possible to conceive of a body. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 70) | |
A reaction: Epicurus doesn't discuss essences, but this seems to commit to the basic Aristotelian idea, that there there are some properties which actually bestow identity, and then others which are optional for that thing. The 'conception' is always mentioned. |
14561 | Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent [Mumford/Anjum] |
Full Idea: Perdurantism tends to go with the view that it is essentially contingent what follows what, because it is no part of the essence of temporal parts that they be arranged in any particular order. | |
From: S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 5.5 1) | |
A reaction: Nice. There is nothing illogical, then, in elderly me intervening between childish me and middle-aged me. Essentialists like me must clearly oppose this view. Elderly me must be preceded and caused by middle-aged me. |