display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
Full Idea: The importance of natural kinds for explanation does not depend on a doctrine of essences. | |
From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: He suggest as the alternative that laws do the explaining, employing natural kinds. He allows that individual essences might be explanatory. |
17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
Full Idea: Contradicting one of the main points of essentialism, there is no reason in principle why a species should not survive the demise of its current genetic mechanisms (some other species coherence gradually taking over). | |
From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: I would say that this meant that the species had a new essence, because I don't take what is essential to be the same as what is necessary. The new genetics would replace the old as the basic explanation of the species. |
17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
Full Idea: It is widely agreed among biologists that no essential property can be found to demarcate species, so that if an essential property is necessary for a natural kind, species are not natural kinds. | |
From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: This uses 'essential' to mean 'necessary', but I would use 'essential' to mean 'deeply explanatory'. Biological species are, nevertheless, dubious members of an ontological system. Vegetables are the problem. |