display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
| 14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
| Full Idea: It is plainly contrary to common sense to say that the phases in the history of a thing are parts of the thing. | |
| From: C.D. Broad (Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy [1933], I.349-50), quoted by Richard Cartwright - Scattered Objects n18 | |
| A reaction: Nicely expressed! To suggest that me ten years ago is a mere part of some huge me, or that you are only talking to a part of me now, is a very long way indeed from normal usage. |
| 14759 | A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad] |
| Full Idea: A thing is simply a long event, throughout the course of which there is either qualitative similarity or continuous qualitative change, together with a characteristic spatio-temporal unity. | |
| From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], 10 'Duration') | |
| A reaction: At least he is trying to give some sort of principle that links the stages of the event together. |
| 11842 | If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad] |
| Full Idea: We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit. | |
| From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13 | |
| A reaction: Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light. |