Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stephen Mumford, Gavin Hesketh and Paul Benacerraf

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
18617 Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
     Full Idea: Substances can survive a change in their parts in a way that a mere aggregate of parts.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 3)
     A reaction: A simple but very important idea. If we then distinguish between 'substances' and 'aggregates' we get a much clearer grip on things. Is the Ship of Theseus a substance or an aggregate? There is no factual answer to that. What do you want to explain?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
14295 Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
     Full Idea: Thermostats, thermometers, axes, spoons, and batteries have dispositional essences, which make them what they are.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 01.2 iv)
     A reaction: I would have thought that we could extend this proposal well beyond artefacts, but it certainly seems particularly clear in artefacts, where a human intention seems to be inescapably involved.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
12248 How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford]
     Full Idea: Essentialists fail to show how we ascend from being a property universally possessed, by all kind members, to the status of being an essential property.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.5)
     A reaction: This is precisely where my proposal comes in - the essential properties, as opposed to the accidentaly universals, are those which explain the nature and behaviour of each kind of thing (and each individual thing).
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
9905 Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf]
     Full Idea: Identity statements make sense only in contexts where there exist possible individuating conditions.
     From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], III)
     A reaction: He is objecting to bizarre identifications involving numbers. An identity statement may be bizarre even if we can clearly individuate the two candidates. Winston Churchill is a Mars Bar. Identifying George Orwell with Eric Blair doesn't need a 'respect'.