display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
17028 | Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton] |
Full Idea: The particles of bodies attract one another at very small distances and cohere when they become contiguous. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of account of unity which has to be given in the corpuscular view of things, once substantial forms are given up. What is missing here is the structure of the thing. A lump of dirt is as unified as a cat in this story. |
18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Substances can survive a change in their parts in a way that a mere aggregate of parts. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: A simple but very important idea. If we then distinguish between 'substances' and 'aggregates' we get a much clearer grip on things. Is the Ship of Theseus a substance or an aggregate? There is no factual answer to that. What do you want to explain? |
17014 | The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton] |
Full Idea: The place of a whole is the same as the sum of the places of the parts, and is therefore internal and in the whole body. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) | |
A reaction: Note that Newton is talking of the sums of places, and deriving them from the parts. This is the mereology of space. |
14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Thermostats, thermometers, axes, spoons, and batteries have dispositional essences, which make them what they are. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 01.2 iv) | |
A reaction: I would have thought that we could extend this proposal well beyond artefacts, but it certainly seems particularly clear in artefacts, where a human intention seems to be inescapably involved. |
12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Essentialists fail to show how we ascend from being a property universally possessed, by all kind members, to the status of being an essential property. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.5) | |
A reaction: This is precisely where my proposal comes in - the essential properties, as opposed to the accidentaly universals, are those which explain the nature and behaviour of each kind of thing (and each individual thing). |