Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stilpo, Denis Diderot and Thomas Hobbes

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16 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location

14960	Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: A body is that, which having no dependence on our thought, is coincident or coextended with some part of space.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.01)
	A reaction: This rather Cartesian view doesn't seem to offer any distinction between empty space and space containing an 'object'. Presumably it is the ancestor of the Quinean account just in terms of space-time points. Don't like it.

17250	If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: One body cannot be in two places at the same time, ...for the place that a body fills being divided into two, the placed body will also be divided into two; the place and the body that fills that place are divided both together.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.08)
	A reaction: If every time you manipulated one body it affected both of them, you might say that one body was in two places, rather like a mirror image.

17249	If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Two bodies cannot be together in the same place, ..because when a body that fills its whole place is divided into two, the place itself is divided into two also, so that there will be two places.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.08)
	A reaction: The wonderful things about philosophy is that you are faced with obvious truths of the world, and cannot begin to think why they are true - and then up steps a philosopher and offers you a reason.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates

17248	If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: How can any whole body be moved, unless all its parts be moved together with it?
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.05)
	A reaction: This might be a distinguishing mark for a whole physical body. I think it is probably the main mark for ordinary folk. I've never found this idea in Aristotle.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16620	A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Nothing can be compounded of matter and form. The matter of a chair is wood; the form is the figure it has, apt for the intended use. Does his Lordship think the chair compounded of the wood and the figure?
	From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:302), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
	A reaction: Aristotle does use the word 'shape' [morphe] when he is discussing hylomorphism, and the statue example seems to support it, but elsewhere the form is a much deeper principle of individuation.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts

16790	A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: A body is always the same, whether the parts of it be put together or dispersed; or whether it be congealed or dissolved.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07)
	A reaction: This appears to be a commitment by Hobbes to what we now call 'classical' mereology - that any bunch of things can count as a whole, whether they are together or dispersed. He seems to mean more than a watch surviving dismantling.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

17244	To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: In composition, it is to be understood that for the making up of a whole there is no need of putting the parts together, so as to make them touch one another, but only of collecting them into one sum in the mind.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.07.08)
	A reaction: This seems to the 'unrestricted composition' of classical mereology, since it appears that Hobbes offers no restriction on which parts can be united by a mind, no matter how bizarre.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

17233	Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Universal things are contained in the nature of singular things.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.04)
	A reaction: That is the neatest and most accurate summary of the situation I have ever read. Particulars come first, but they are all riddled with generalities (but that is not as well said as Hobbes's remark).

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

17246	Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: There are certain accidents which can never perish except the body perish also.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.03)
	A reaction: He is just making an observation, and not proposing a theory about essence.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

17251	The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: That accident for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which denominates its subject, is commonly called the essence thereof.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.23)
	A reaction: This is clearly a prelude to Locke's more carefully formulated 'nominal essence'. Fairly obvious, for nominalist empiricists. A bit surprising to say this was 'common'.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

16622	Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Essence and all other abstract names are words artificial belonging to the art of logic, and signify only the manner how we consider the substance itself.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:308), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
	A reaction: I sympathise quite a lot with this view, but not with its dismissive tone. The key question I take to be: if you reject essences entirely (having read too much physics), how are we going to think about entities in the world in future?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers

17257	It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: That will be the same river which flows from one and the same fountain, whether the same water, or other water, or something other than water, flow thence.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07)
	A reaction: This makes the source the one necessity for a river. I think the end matters too. If the Thames reversed direction, and flowed into Wales, it would not be the Thames any more.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus

12853	Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: In the Ship of Theseus, some place individuity in the unity of matter; others, in the unity of form.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07)
	A reaction: Simons raises this comment into a dogma, that there are at least two objects present in the ship. If I offered you a sum for the contents of your house, they would have a unity of monetary value.

17256	If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: If some man kept the old planks as they were taken out, and by putting them afterwards together again in the same order, had again made a ship of them, ...there would have been two ships numerically the same, which is absurd.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07)
	A reaction: This is the origin of the famous modern problematical example of the Ship of Theseus. The ancient example is just the case of whether you step into the same river, but using an artefact with parts, to make it clearer.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

16794	As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: It makes a great difference to ask concerning Socrates whether he is the same human being or whether he is the same body. For his body, when he is old, cannot be the same it was when he was an infant. …He can, however, be the same human being.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07)
	A reaction: This is not commitment to full (Geachian) relative identity, but it notes the problem.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law

17255	Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Two bodies are said to differ from one another, when something may be said of one of them, which cannot be said of the other at the same time.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.02)
	A reaction: Note the astute addition of 'at the same time'. Note also that it is couched in terms of what is true, rather than in terms of 'properties' or 'accidents'.