Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stilpo, Jonathan Schaffer and Peter Alexander

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4 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
15959 If the substantial form of brass implies its stability, how can it melt and remain brass? [Alexander,P]
     Full Idea: If we account for the stability of a piece of brass by reference to the substantial form of brass, then it is mysterious how it can be melted and yet remain brass.
     From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 02.3)
     A reaction: [Alexander is discussing Boyle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
15956 The peripatetics treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter, and non-material [Alexander,P]
     Full Idea: The peripatetic philosophers, in spite of their disagreements, all treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter and not to be understood in material terms.
     From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 54)
     A reaction: This is the simple reason why hylomorphism became totally discredited, in the face of the 'mechanical philosophy'. But there must be a physical version of hylomorphism, and I don't think Aristotle himself would reject it.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: I am happy to accept universal composition, on the grounds that there are heaps, piles etc with no integral unity, and that arbitrary composites are no less unified than heaps.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1 n11)
     A reaction: The metaphysical focus is then placed on what constitutes 'integral unity', which is precisely the question which most interested Aristotle. Clearly if there is nothing more to an entity than its components, scattering them isn't destruction.
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The notion of grounding my capture a crucial mereological distinction (missing from classical mereology) between an integrated whole with genuine unity, and a mere aggregate. x is an integrated whole if it grounds its proper parts.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: That gives a nice theoretical notion, but if you remove each of the proper parts, does x remain? Is it a bare particular? I take it that it will have to be an abstract principle, the one Aristotle was aiming at with his notion of 'form'. Schaffer agrees.