Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Barbara Vetter and Robert C. Stalnaker

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12 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
12764 For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12761 An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
16467 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12762 Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19030 Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter]
19040 We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
16453 The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]