Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, Barbara Vetter and Robert C. Stalnaker
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6 ideas
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
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Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
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An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
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'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
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Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
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Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
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Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
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