Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaximander, David M. Armstrong and Colin McGinn

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20 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
17668 It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
18892 Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12019 McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
18389 When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
6058 Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
6053 Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
6043 Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn]
10024 The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
6044 Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn]
6046 Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn]
6045 It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
17680 The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
6066 Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn]
6054 Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
6047 All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
6049 Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn]
6048 Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn]
6050 Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn]