Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Brand Blanshard, Katherine Hawley and Peter Simons

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51 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
16232 An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12850 To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
12860 Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
12886 A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
16200 Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley]
12835 Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons]
12857 Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16237 The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley]
16238 Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
12820 Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
16220 Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley]
16222 Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
12866 Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16228 The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
16229 Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley]
14492 If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley]
12867 A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12864 We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
12814 Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons]
12817 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons]
12833 If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons]
12849 Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons]
12877 Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12888 The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12871 Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12870 We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12873 Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12874 An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
16193 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley]
16195 Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley]
16202 The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
16192 Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley]
16196 Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
16197 How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley]
16191 Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley]
16199 If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley]
16201 Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley]
16240 If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley]
12837 Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
16206 Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley]
16203 Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley]
16204 Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley]
16212 An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley]
16213 Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley]
16205 The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
12856 Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons]
12885 Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
12854 An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons]
12855 The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12872 The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16225 If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley]