Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Craig Bourne, C.B. Martin and Friedrich Nietzsche
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13 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
7189
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Maybe there are only subjects, and 'objects' result from relations between subjects [Nietzsche]
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18314
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In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche]
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7207
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Counting needs unities, but that doesn't mean they exist; we borrowed it from the concept of 'I' [Nietzsche]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
20362
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We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15476
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Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
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15465
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Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
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I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15474
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Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
24089
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Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
20376
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We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
7161
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The essence of a thing is only an opinion about the 'thing' [Nietzsche]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15486
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Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
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15475
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The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
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