Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Dennis Whitcomb, Andr Gallois and Peter Geach
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12 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
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We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
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A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
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Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
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If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
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4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
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Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
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Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
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Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
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Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
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If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
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Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
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Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]
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