Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Einstein,A/Infeld,L, Theodosius and David Lewis

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36 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
15455 Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
15537 If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
15536 We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
14748 The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis]
6129 Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
15512 In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis]
14210 A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
15519 Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis]
15521 Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis]
15522 The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10566 Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K]
9667 Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis]
13268 There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider]
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
14244 Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
10660 A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis]
10810 I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13793 An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
9663 A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
14737 Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
9664 Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis]
9665 There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19280 I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15968 Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15969 Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis]