Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Galen, David M. Armstrong and George Molnar

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9 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
17668 It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
11917 Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar]
11955 There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11918 The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
18389 When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
10024 The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
17680 The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]