Combining Philosophers
Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Bertrand Russell and Richard T.W. Arthur
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19 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
14732
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A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell]
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6473
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Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
7781
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I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell]
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21536
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When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
21531
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Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell]
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18777
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If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
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21545
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I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
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21547
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On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
14166
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Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
21535
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Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
14164
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The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
14112
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A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
6465
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We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
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6471
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The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
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14733
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An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
14435
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The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14170
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Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
14107
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Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell]
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11849
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It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell]
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