Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E., Lucretius and Theodore Sider
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19 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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14745
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If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
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14740
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If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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14752
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Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
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14743
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The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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14747
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'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
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14757
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Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
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15026
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Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
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14727
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Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider]
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14738
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Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
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14726
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Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider]
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14728
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4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider]
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14729
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4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
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14730
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Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider]
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14762
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Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider]
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14731
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Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider]
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14758
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How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
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14741
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The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
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13702
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The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
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14754
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If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
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