Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hermarchus, Gottlob Frege and Theodore Sider
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37 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
8647
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Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
10309
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Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale]
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10550
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Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett]
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18269
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Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
8785
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For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
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10278
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Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro]
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8489
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The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
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10535
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Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett]
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9877
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Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17432
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Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14745
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If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
14740
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If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14752
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Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
14743
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The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9891
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The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
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9388
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Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
14747
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'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
14757
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Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15026
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Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
14727
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Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider]
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14738
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Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14726
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Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider]
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14728
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4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider]
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14729
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4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
14730
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Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider]
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14731
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Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider]
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14758
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How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider]
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14762
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Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
14741
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The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
16022
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The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan]
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11100
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Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine]
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4893
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Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
12153
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Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
3318
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Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
9853
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Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
13702
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The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14754
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If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
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