Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Gottlob Frege and Theodore Sider

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37 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale]
Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett]
Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro]
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett]
Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider]
Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider]
4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider]
4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider]
Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider]
How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider]
Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan]
Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine]
Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]