Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Immanuel Kant, Johann Winckelmann and Katherine Hawley
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
35 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
16232
|
An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley]
|
5533
|
Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant]
|
21449
|
The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
5550
|
A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
21451
|
All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant]
|
5564
|
Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
11833
|
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
16200
|
Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16237
|
The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley]
|
16238
|
Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
16220
|
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley]
|
16222
|
Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley]
|
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16228
|
The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
|
16229
|
Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley]
|
14492
|
If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
5626
|
An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
16193
|
'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley]
|
16195
|
Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley]
|
16202
|
The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
16192
|
Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley]
|
16196
|
Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
16197
|
How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley]
|
16191
|
Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley]
|
16199
|
If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley]
|
16201
|
Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley]
|
16240
|
If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
16203
|
Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley]
|
16204
|
Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley]
|
16212
|
An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley]
|
16213
|
Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley]
|
16205
|
The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley]
|
16206
|
Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
7576
|
The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley]
|
14509
|
If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16225
|
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley]
|