Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Immanuel Kant and Penelope Mackie
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
20 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
5533
|
Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant]
|
21449
|
The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant]
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897
|
A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
|
11898
|
Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883
|
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
5550
|
A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
21451
|
All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant]
|
5564
|
Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
11833
|
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889
|
Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877
|
An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
|
11882
|
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
|
11886
|
There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909
|
Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
|
11899
|
Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906
|
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
5626
|
An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894
|
Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
7576
|
The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley]
|
14509
|
If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant]
|