Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Trenton Merricks

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29 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects

6124	I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks]

6134	Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks]

23466

Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought

22320

An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects

14392

Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples

23467

Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]

6125	We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects

14229

Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins]

6142	The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks]

14472

If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson]

14469

Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

23468

Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance

10710

We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Wittgenstein, by Potter]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

6137	Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object

6127	'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks]

6131	Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks]

6132	Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks]

6141	There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

6130	'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]

6138	It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects

6128	Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

15106

Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

22321

To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

14410

You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential

19214

In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time

6136	Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity

6056	Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity

22322

You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity

6057	Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]