Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Michael Burke, Helen Cartwright and John Hawthorne
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13 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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16235
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Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
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14753
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The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
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16072
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'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
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14590
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If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
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14751
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Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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16071
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Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
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16234
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Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
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13278
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Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
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14750
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Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
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15128
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We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
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15121
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An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
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14591
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Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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8970
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Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]
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