Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Peter Geach, Gottfried Leibniz and Aristotle

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69 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi]
Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis]
The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz]
Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz]
Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz]
A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle]
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle]
Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis]
To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis]
Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle]
If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle]
An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle]
Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz]
A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz]
A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle]
Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis]
If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle]
The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz]
Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle]
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt]
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle]
The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz]
A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins]