Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Peter Geach, Gottfried Leibniz and Aristotle

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21 ideas

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle]
Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle]
You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz]
No two things are totally identical [Leibniz]
Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz]
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]