Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Graeme Forbes and Peter Simons
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43 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12017
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In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
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12850
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To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
12860
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Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
12886
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A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
12857
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Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons]
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12835
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Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
12024
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If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
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12820
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Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
12866
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Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
12867
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A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12864
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We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
12814
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Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons]
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12817
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'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons]
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12833
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If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons]
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12849
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Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons]
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12877
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Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887
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A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
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12888
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The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11885
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Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
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12014
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An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
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12015
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Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12013
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Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
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12871
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Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
13804
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A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
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13805
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Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12012
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Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
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13808
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A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12870
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We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
13806
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Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
13807
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A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12873
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Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons]
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12022
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Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
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12025
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Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
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13809
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One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12874
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An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
12837
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Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
12856
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Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons]
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12885
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Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
12854
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An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons]
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12855
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The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12020
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An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
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12872
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The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11888
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Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
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