Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Richard Price, Ruth Barcan Marcus and Alan Sidelle
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8 ideas
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
15184
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Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180
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Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
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11186
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'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
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11185
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'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15172
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Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
15181
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Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182
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If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15173
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That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle]
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