Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Ryan Wasserman, Epicurus and Robert C. Stalnaker

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16 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects

14617

Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties

14524

Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates

14046

A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

16065

Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]

16067

Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]

16069

There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum

12764

For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]

16407

Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects

16068

The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

12761

An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]

16467

'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

12763

Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

14047

Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

12762

Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

16074

Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

16453

The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]