Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Weisberg/Needham/Hendry, Kathrin Koslicki and John Locke

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79 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
12499 Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
1211 Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke]
12508 Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
12506 A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke]
12563 Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
12529 I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
14495 I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki]
13264 If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki]
24065 Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
8546 Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
1196 We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke]
12536 We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7945 We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
12485 We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14497 The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki]
13280 Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
16796 Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
24066 The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
14496 Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
12507 A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
13279 There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
12559 Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
14498 For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
13283 The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13266 Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
14500 Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
13281 Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
12498 Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke]
12520 The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke]
13771 Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke]
15110 An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
16038 Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
12810 We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley]
16786 You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke]
15992 Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
15990 Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
15113 Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
24067 Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12530 The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke]
12532 Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke]
12539 If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12510 Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke]
11155 Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
12560 We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke]
15112 If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
16787 Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
16028 Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
12305 Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi]
15985 It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke]
12534 We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
13434 In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
16035 If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
16036 Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12540 Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
12812 Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
16031 Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
15646 If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle]
12306 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
15988 The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke]
15644 In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke]
12537 To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke]
16029 Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
12531 Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]
13433 Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
12533 Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke]
12557 Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
12561 For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
12525 The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke]
13431 A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke]
13423 The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12804 There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley]
12547 We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
12503 Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
12505 One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16795 Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
12504 Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]