Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Willard Quine, Friedrich Schlegel and Timothy Williamson
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25 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
1628
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If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
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7924
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The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine]
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8498
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Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine]
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8464
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Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine]
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9018
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A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
13387
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Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15783
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Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
8277
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I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine]
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18441
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No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
6861
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What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
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9602
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Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
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21630
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If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10923
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Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
10929
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Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
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10930
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Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
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8482
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Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine]
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12136
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Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine]
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13590
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Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
9019
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Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
21632
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A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17595
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To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
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18965
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We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
17594
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We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
18440
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Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
11095
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We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine]
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