210 ideas
15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis] |
15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
5486 | Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis] |
15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis] |
15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis] |
5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG] |
13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis] |
9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis] |
5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis] |
18398 | Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis] |
13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis] |
13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis] |
15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis] |
13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis] |
15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis] |
5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis] |
13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis] |
13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis] |
15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
5443 | Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable [Ellis] |
5444 | 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis] |
13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
5462 | Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate [Ellis] |
15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
5448 | 'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis] |
13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis] |
15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
5477 | One thing can look like something else, without being the something else [Ellis] |
15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis] |
15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
5479 | Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
5483 | Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis] |
13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis] |
5447 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis] |
15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
5476 | Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis] |
5478 | Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis] |
15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis] |
15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
5453 | Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction [Ellis] |
5466 | Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass [Ellis] |
15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis] |
15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
5485 | Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis] |
15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
13597 | Good explanations unify [Ellis] |
5484 | Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis] |
13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis] |
15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis] |
15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis] |
15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
5457 | Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [Ellis, by PG] |
15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis] |
5489 | Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions [Ellis] |
5490 | Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right [Ellis] |
7907 | Human killing is worse if the victim is virtuous [Buddhaghosa] |
6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
5472 | Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures [Ellis] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis] |
5471 | Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws [Ellis] |
13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
5446 | For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical [Ellis] |
5480 | The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws [Ellis] |
15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis] |
15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
5445 | Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis] |
5463 | Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis] |
5491 | A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis] |
13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis] |
5442 | For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside [Ellis] |
5473 | The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds [Ellis] |
5474 | Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances [Ellis] |
5475 | We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws [Ellis] |
6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
5460 | Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once [Ellis] |
15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis] |
13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis] |
13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis] |
13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis] |
5459 | Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws [Ellis] |
5461 | The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell [Ellis] |
6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
5464 | For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis] |
15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
5487 | Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology [Ellis] |
6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |
15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |