11 ideas
4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
23217 | All of our happiness and misery arises entirely from the brain [Hippocrates] |
4316 | Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham] |
4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham] |