105 ideas
9535 | 'Contradictory' propositions always differ in truth-value [Lemmon] |
9512 | We write the 'negation' of P (not-P) as ¬ [Lemmon] |
9511 | We write the conditional 'if P (antecedent) then Q (consequent)' as P→Q [Lemmon] |
9510 | That proposition that either P or Q is their 'disjunction', written P∨Q [Lemmon] |
9514 | If A and B are 'interderivable' from one another we may write A -||- B [Lemmon] |
9508 | The sign |- may be read as 'therefore' [Lemmon] |
9509 | That proposition that both P and Q is their 'conjunction', written P∧Q [Lemmon] |
9513 | We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q; it is also P iff Q, or (P→Q)∧(Q→P) [Lemmon] |
9532 | 'Subcontrary' propositions are never both false, so that A∨B is a tautology [Lemmon] |
9533 | A 'implies' B if B is true whenever A is true (so that A→B is tautologous) [Lemmon] |
9516 | A 'well-formed formula' follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔ [Lemmon] |
9518 | A 'theorem' is the conclusion of a provable sequent with zero assumptions [Lemmon] |
9528 | A wff is a 'tautology' if all assignments to variables result in the value T [Lemmon] |
9530 | A wff is 'contingent' if produces at least one T and at least one F [Lemmon] |
9517 | The 'scope' of a connective is the connective, the linked formulae, and the brackets [Lemmon] |
9529 | A wff is 'inconsistent' if all assignments to variables result in the value F [Lemmon] |
9519 | A 'substitution-instance' is a wff formed by consistent replacing variables with wffs [Lemmon] |
9531 | 'Contrary' propositions are never both true, so that ¬(A∧B) is a tautology [Lemmon] |
9534 | Two propositions are 'equivalent' if they mirror one another's truth-value [Lemmon] |
9397 | CP: Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B [Lemmon] |
9393 | A: we may assume any proposition at any stage [Lemmon] |
9399 | ∧E: Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately [Lemmon] |
9401 | ∨E: Derive C from A∨B, if C can be derived both from A and from B [Lemmon] |
9398 | ∧I: Given A and B, we may derive A∧B [Lemmon] |
9402 | RAA: If assuming A will prove B∧¬B, then derive ¬A [Lemmon] |
9395 | MTT: Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A [Lemmon] |
9396 | DN: Given A, we may derive ¬¬A [Lemmon] |
9394 | MPP: Given A and A→B, we may derive B [Lemmon] |
9400 | ∨I: Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B [Lemmon] |
9522 | 'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q [Lemmon] |
9521 | 'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q [Lemmon] |
9525 | We can change conditionals into negated conjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) [Lemmon] |
9524 | We can change conditionals into disjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q [Lemmon] |
9523 | De Morgan's Laws make negated conjunctions/disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions/conjunctions [Lemmon] |
9527 | The Distributive Laws can rearrange a pair of conjunctions or disjunctions [Lemmon] |
9526 | We can change conjunctions into negated conditionals with P→Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) [Lemmon] |
9537 | Truth-tables are good for showing invalidity [Lemmon] |
9538 | A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, but this won't work for more complex logic [Lemmon] |
9536 | If any of the nine rules of propositional logic are applied to tautologies, the result is a tautology [Lemmon] |
9539 | Propositional logic is complete, since all of its tautologous sequents are derivable [Lemmon] |
13909 | Write '(∀x)(...)' to mean 'take any x: then...', and '(∃x)(...)' to mean 'there is an x such that....' [Lemmon] |
13902 | 'Gm' says m has property G, and 'Pmn' says m has relation P to n [Lemmon] |
13911 | The 'symbols' are bracket, connective, term, variable, predicate letter, reverse-E [Lemmon] |
13910 | Our notation uses 'predicate-letters' (for 'properties'), 'variables', 'proper names', 'connectives' and 'quantifiers' [Lemmon] |
13904 | Universal Elimination (UE) lets us infer that an object has F, from all things having F [Lemmon] |
13901 | Predicate logic uses propositional connectives and variables, plus new introduction and elimination rules [Lemmon] |
13903 | Universal elimination if you start with the universal, introduction if you want to end with it [Lemmon] |
13906 | With finite named objects, we can generalise with &-Intro, but otherwise we need ∀-Intro [Lemmon] |
13908 | UE all-to-one; UI one-to-all; EI arbitrary-to-one; EE proof-to-one [Lemmon] |
13905 | If there is a finite domain and all objects have names, complex conjunctions can replace universal quantifiers [Lemmon] |
13900 | 'Some Frenchmen are generous' is rendered by (∃x)(Fx→Gx), and not with the conditional → [Lemmon] |
22246 | A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati] |
9520 | The paradoxes of material implication are P |- Q → P, and ¬P |- P → Q [Lemmon] |
16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
7647 | The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie] |
7645 | When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie] |
23225 | The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie] |
7652 | Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie] |
7650 | All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie] |
18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
22247 | Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati] |
22248 | How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati] |
16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
22242 | Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati] |
22243 | The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati] |
7651 | With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie] |
16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
22245 | A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati] |
16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
22250 | There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati] |
22249 | The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati] |
7648 | The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie] |
7646 | There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie] |
7649 | There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie] |