Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Aeschylus, Francis de Vitoria and Max J. Cresswell

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: Normal propositional modal logics derive from the minimal system K: wffs of PC are axioms; □(p⊃q)⊃(□p⊃□q); uniform substitution; modus ponens; necessitation (α→□α).
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: If a frame contains any dead end or blind world, then D is not valid on that frame, ...but D is valid on every serial frame.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.1)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: In S4 there are exactly 14 distinct modalities, and any modality may be reduced to one containing no more than three modal operators in sequence.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2)
     A reaction: The significance of this may be unclear, but it illustrates one of the rewards of using formal systems to think about modal problems. There is at least an appearance of precision, even if it is only conditional precision.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: S5 contains the four main reduction laws, so the first of any pair of operators may be deleted. Hence all but the last modal operator may be deleted. This leaves six modalities: p, ◊p, □p, and their negations.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: If one wants the quantifiers in each world to range only over the things that exist in that world, and one doesn't believe that the same things exist in every world, one would probably not want the Barcan formula.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.2.2)
     A reaction: I haven't quite got this, but it sounds to me like I should reject the Barcan formula (but Idea 9449!). I like a metaphysics to rest on the actual world (with modal properties). I assume different things could have existed, but don't.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2)
     A reaction: If a thing has a relation to two separate things, then those two things will also have that relation between them. If I am in the same family as Jim and as Jill, then Jim and Jill are in the same family.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: A de dicto necessary truth says that something is φ, that this proposition is a necessary truth, i.e. that in every accessible world something (but not necessarily the same thing in each world) is φ.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.2.1)
     A reaction: At last, a really clear and illuminating account of this term! The question is then invited of what is the truthmaker for a de dicto truth, assuming that the objects themselves are truthmakers for de re truths.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus shows blood feuds replaced by law [Aeschylus, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus tells how the old rule of revenge and blood feud was replaced by a due process of law before a civil jury.
     From: report of Aeschylus (The Eumenides [c.458 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.2
     A reaction: Compare Idea 1659, where this revolution is attributed to Protagoras (a little later than Aeschylus). I take the rule of law and of society to be above all the rule of reason, because the aim is calm objectivity instead of emotion.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Leaders can only attack foreigners who have done wrong (as with their own subjects) [Vitoria]
     Full Idea: A political leader cannot have greater authority over foreigners than over his own subjects; but he may not draw the sword against his own subjects unless they have done wrong; therefore he can only do so against foreigners in the same circumstances.
     From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.303), quoted by Jeff McMahan - Killing in War 1.4
     A reaction: The question would then be whether they have 'done some wrong' against this leader, or against some other people (such as their fellow citizens). That would be the 'intervention' justification. Are they engaged in the wrong, or responsible for it?
The only just cause for a war is a wrong received [Vitoria]
     Full Idea: There is a single and only just cause for commencing a war, namely, a wrong received.
     From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.170), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 04
     A reaction: Walzer affirms this as one the principles of international law. In particular, mere differences of religion or politics cannot justify a war. The tricky bit is when the participants don't agree on the severity of the wrong.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
Princes should not justify a war to their subjects, and doing so would undermine the state [Vitoria]
     Full Idea: A prince is not able and ought not always to render reasons for the war to its subjects, and if the subjects cannot serve in the war except they be satisfied of its justice, the state would fall into grave peril.
     From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.176), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 03
     A reaction: This medieval view depends entirely on the absolute sovereignty of princes, and confidence that princes are wise and innately just. No student of history should believe such wicked nonsense.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Sacking a city is lawful if it motivates the attacking troops [Vitoria]
     Full Idea: It is not unlawful to put a city to sack, if it is necessary for the conduct of the war …as a spur to the courage of the troops.
     From: Francis de Vitoria (On the Law of War [1525], p.184), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 08
     A reaction: Hideous. Presumably this would include raping the women. Could you motivate a football team in a similar way? Or to get your children to pass exams?