Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Aeschylus, Jonathan Bennett and Max J. Cresswell

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: Normal propositional modal logics derive from the minimal system K: wffs of PC are axioms; □(p⊃q)⊃(□p⊃□q); uniform substitution; modus ponens; necessitation (α→□α).
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: If a frame contains any dead end or blind world, then D is not valid on that frame, ...but D is valid on every serial frame.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.1)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: In S4 there are exactly 14 distinct modalities, and any modality may be reduced to one containing no more than three modal operators in sequence.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2)
     A reaction: The significance of this may be unclear, but it illustrates one of the rewards of using formal systems to think about modal problems. There is at least an appearance of precision, even if it is only conditional precision.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: S5 contains the four main reduction laws, so the first of any pair of operators may be deleted. Hence all but the last modal operator may be deleted. This leaves six modalities: p, ◊p, □p, and their negations.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: If one wants the quantifiers in each world to range only over the things that exist in that world, and one doesn't believe that the same things exist in every world, one would probably not want the Barcan formula.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.2.2)
     A reaction: I haven't quite got this, but it sounds to me like I should reject the Barcan formula (but Idea 9449!). I like a metaphysics to rest on the actual world (with modal properties). I assume different things could have existed, but don't.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Perhaps it is impossible that an event should have had a causal history different from the one that it actually had.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.220)
     A reaction: [He cites van Inwagen for this] The idea is analagous to baptismal accounts of reference. Individuate an event by its history. It might depend (as Davidson implies) on how you describe the event.
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
     Full Idea: It has been argued that an event's time of occurrence is essential to it.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.221)
     A reaction: [He cites Lawrence Lombard] This sound initially implausible, particularly if a rival event happened, say, .1 of a second later than the actual event. It might depend on one's view about determinism. Interesting.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
     A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2)
     A reaction: If a thing has a relation to two separate things, then those two things will also have that relation between them. If I am in the same family as Jim and as Jill, then Jim and Jill are in the same family.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell]
     Full Idea: A de dicto necessary truth says that something is φ, that this proposition is a necessary truth, i.e. that in every accessible world something (but not necessarily the same thing in each world) is φ.
     From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.2.1)
     A reaction: At last, a really clear and illuminating account of this term! The question is then invited of what is the truthmaker for a de dicto truth, assuming that the objects themselves are truthmakers for de re truths.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus shows blood feuds replaced by law [Aeschylus, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus tells how the old rule of revenge and blood feud was replaced by a due process of law before a civil jury.
     From: report of Aeschylus (The Eumenides [c.458 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.2
     A reaction: Compare Idea 1659, where this revolution is attributed to Protagoras (a little later than Aeschylus). I take the rule of law and of society to be above all the rule of reason, because the aim is calm objectivity instead of emotion.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Although you cannot cause a fire by delaying something's burning, you can cause a fire by hastening something's burning.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.223)
     A reaction: A very nice observation which brings out all sorts of problems about identifying causes. Bennett is criticising the counterfactual account. It is part of the problem of pre-emption, where causes are queueing up to produce a given effect.
Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
     Full Idea: We must choose between subsumption and counterfactual analyses of causal statements. The former means that cause and effect have some properties that enables them to be subsumed under a conditional. The latter is just 'if no-c then no-e'.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.217)
     A reaction: I have an immediate preference for the former account, which seems to potentially connect it with physics and features of the world which make one thing lead to another. The counterfactual account seems very thin, and is more like mere semantics.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Theories of causation are split between event and fact/state of affairs theories. The first have the form 'the explosion caused the fire' (perfect nominals) and the second have the form 'the fire started because a bomb dropped' (sentential clauses).
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987])
     A reaction: Surely events must have priority? The form which uses facts is drifting off into explanation, and is much more likely to involve subjective human elements and interpretations. Events are closer to the physics, and the mechanics of what happens.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
     A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
     Full Idea: The refinement of a simple counterfactual analysis is to say that cause and effect depend on a series of events. This must be asserted because counterfactual conditionals are well known not to be transitive.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987])
     A reaction: This fills out the theory, but offers another target for critics. If the glue that binds the series is not in the counterfactuals, is it just in the mind of the speaker? How do you decide what's in the series? Cf. deciding offside in football (soccer!).
A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Any counterfactual about a particular event implies or presupposes something about the event's essence.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.219)
     A reaction: This is where the counterfactual theory suddenly becomes more interesting, instead of just being a rather bare account of the logical structure of causation. (Bennett offers some discussion of possible essential implications).
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: Because of the multidimensionality of space and unidimensionality of time, empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not.
     From: report of Jonathan Bennett (Kant's Analytic [1966], p.175) by Sydney Shoemaker - Time Without Change p.49 n4
     A reaction: An interesting observation, which could have been used by Samuel Clarke in his attempts to prove absolute space to Leibniz. The point does not prove absolute space, of course, but it seems to make a difference.