Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Agrippa, Aristippus the younger and Peter Forrest

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


16 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Twelfth mode: all reasoning leads on to further reasoning, and this process goes on forever.
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Fifteenth mode: proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved.
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Fourteenth mode: reasoning requires arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses.
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Eleventh mode: all topics of discussion are full of uncertainty and contradiction.
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
     Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker.
     From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1)
     A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics, placing all experience within themselves, thought such evidence was insufficient warrant for certainty about reality, and withdrew as in a siege from the world, admitting that objects 'appear', but refusing to pronounce the word 'are'.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1120
     A reaction: This seems to be the most extreme position found in ancient thought. It accompanies their extreme hedonism, based on the reality of experience and lack of interest in anything external. A bit daft, really.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: Forrest proposed that structural universals should serve as ersatz possible worlds.
     From: report of Peter Forrest (Ways Worlds Could Be [1986]) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Intro'
     A reaction: I prefer powers to property universals. Perhaps a possible world is a maximal set of co-existing dispositions?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Agrippa's Trilemma offers three possible outcomes for a regress of justification: the chain goes on for ever (infinite); or the chain stops at an unjustified proposition (arbitrary); or the chain eventually includes the original proposition (circular).
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60], §2) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §2
     A reaction: This summarises Ideas 1911, 1913 and 1914. Agrippa's Trilemma is now a standard starting point for modern discussions of foundations. Personally I reject 2, and am torn between 1 (+ social consensus) and 3 (with a benign, coherent circle).
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Thirteenth mode: everything is always perceived in relation to something else.
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Even the foolish may have some virtues [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics say that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Actions are influenced by circumstances, so Cyrenaics say felons should be reformed, not hated [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics say errors should be pardoned, because men do not err intentionally but are influenced by circumstances; one should not hate a person, but only teach him better.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9
     A reaction: A very appealing suggestion, and rather wonderful for its time. There is still implied agreement about what is 'error', and what counts as 'better'.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Cyrenaics teach that honour, justice and shame are all based on custom and fashion [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics taught that there was nothing naturally and intrinsically just, or honourable, or disgraceful; but that things were considered so because of law and fashion.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
     A reaction: As we would say now, values and virtues are 'cultural constructs'. This obviously contains a lot of truth, but I don't think our opposition of genocide is just 'fashion'.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: A Cyrenaic will not consider anyone else of equal importance with himself.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Cyrenaics say wise men are self-sufficient, needing no friends [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics say wise men are sufficient to themselves, and so have no need of friends.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.13