9 ideas
1813 | All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Twelfth mode: all reasoning leads on to further reasoning, and this process goes on forever. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
1811 | Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fifteenth mode: proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
1815 | Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fourteenth mode: reasoning requires arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
1812 | All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Eleventh mode: all topics of discussion are full of uncertainty and contradiction. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
Full Idea: It is surely less plausible to suppose that logical truth consists in correspondence to the facts than that 'factual' truth does. | |
From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.6) |
2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
Full Idea: The definition of truth will have to be, Tarski argues, relative to a language, for one and the same sentence may be true in one language, and false or meaningless in another. | |
From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.5) |
8850 | Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Agrippa's Trilemma offers three possible outcomes for a regress of justification: the chain goes on for ever (infinite); or the chain stops at an unjustified proposition (arbitrary); or the chain eventually includes the original proposition (circular). | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60], §2) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §2 | |
A reaction: This summarises Ideas 1911, 1913 and 1914. Agrippa's Trilemma is now a standard starting point for modern discussions of foundations. Personally I reject 2, and am torn between 1 (+ social consensus) and 3 (with a benign, coherent circle). |
1814 | Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Thirteenth mode: everything is always perceived in relation to something else. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
1658 | In early Greece the word for punishment was also the word for vengeance [Vlastos] |
Full Idea: Down to the last third of the fifth century, 'timoria', whose original and always primary sense is "vengeance", is THE word for "punishment". | |
From: Gregory Vlastos (Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher [1991], p.186) |