94 ideas
19608 | Wisdom is just the last gasp of a dying civilization [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is the last word of an expiring civilization, the nimbus of historic twilights, fatigue transfigured into a vision of the world, the last tolerance before the advent of newer gods, and of barbarism. A vain attempt at melody among the death rattles. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Twilight') | |
A reaction: I didn't quite get what he said there, but I picked up the tone all right. But I thought wisdom was something sought in the early stages of western civilization, and now relegated to the wings as an idle dream? |
23064 | So-called wisdom is just pondering things instead of acting [Cioran] |
Full Idea: What is known as 'wisdom' is ultimately only a perpetual 'thinking it over', i.e. non-action as first impulse. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 01) | |
A reaction: This may be how most people view wisdom. Wisdom is for the spectators, not the actors (perhaps). Wisdom needs a lot of thought, and I don't associate it with extremely active people. |
9247 | Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus] |
Full Idea: Life will be lived all the better if it has no meaning. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
A reaction: One image of the good life is that of a successful wild animal, for which existence is not a problem, merely a constant activity and pursuit. Maybe life begins to acquire meaning once we realise that meaning should not be sought directly. |
19624 | Intelligence only fully flourishes at the end of a historical period [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Intelligence flourishes only in the ages when beliefs wither. ...Every period's ending is the mind's paradise, for the mind regains its play and its whims only within an organism in utter dissolution. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Felicity') | |
A reaction: I wouldn't have thought that the facts of history supported this very well. The golden ages of philosophy are the Age of Pericles, the Aristotelian Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the early twentieth century. |
19599 | Ideas are neutral, but people fill them with passion and weakness [Cioran] |
Full Idea: In itself, every idea is neutral, or should be; but man animates ideas, projects his flames and flaws into them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Genealogy') | |
A reaction: If it isn't neutral (if, say, it expresses love or hatred) then presumably it doesn't qualify as an 'idea'. Are ideas as neutral as mathematical theorems. It's a nice remark, and a good epigraph for a book on the history of ideas. |
19631 | The history of ideas (and deeds) occurs in a meaningless environment [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The history of ideas, like that of deeds, unfolds in a meaningless climate. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This is the 'Tory' view of the history of ideas (as opposed to the 'Whig' view of directedness - a distinction made by historians). I would say there are periods where a certain inevitable sequence is worked out, but then there are dislocations. |
19645 | Some thinkers would have been just as dynamic, no matter when they had lived [Cioran] |
Full Idea: A Kierkegaard, a Nietzsche, had they appeared in the most anodyne age, would have had no less tremulous, no less incendiary an inspiration. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Truths') | |
A reaction: He is saying that some (only some) thinkers are independent of the age and culture in which they live. Personally I think of those two as distinctive products of a romantic age. Diogenes of Sinope seems a bit of a misfit! |
19629 | A nation gives expression to its sum of values, and is then exhausted [Cioran] |
Full Idea: A nation cannot create indefinitely. It is called upon to give expression and meaning to a sum of values which are exhausted with the soul which has begotten them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This phenomenon is obvious. Is it the people who run out of steam, or the ideas and values to which their nation is giving expression? Is this a reason to break up nations every few centuries, and re-form them differently? Break up the UK! |
6707 | Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus] |
Full Idea: There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judgine whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], p.11) | |
A reaction: What a wonderful thesis for a book. In Idea 2682 there is the possibility of life being worth living, but not worth a huge amount of effort. It is better to call Camus' question the first question, rather than the only question. |
19618 | I abandoned philosophy because it didn't acknowledge melancholy and human weakness [Cioran] |
Full Idea: I turned away from philosophy when it became impossible to discover in Kant any human weakness, any authentic accent of melancholy; in Kant and in all the philosophers. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: An interesting challenge, but if I set out to develop a philosophy based on human weakness I'm not sure where I would start, once I had settled the 'akrasia' [weakness of will] problem. |
19621 | Originality in philosophy is just the invention of terms [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The philosopher's originality comes down to inventing terms. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: Analytic philosophers are just as obsessed with inventing terms as their continental rivals. Kit Fine, for example. It can't be wrong to invent terms. Scientists do it too. |
19607 | The mind is superficial, only concerned with the arrangement of events, not their significance [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The mind in itself can be only superficial, its nature being uniquely concerned with the arrangement of conceptual events, and not with their implications in the spheres the signify. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 'The Abstract') | |
A reaction: This may be excessively pessimistic, and any decent philosopher must partially concede the point. Thoughts about the significance of historical events just recede into the mist. |
9245 | To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus] |
Full Idea: To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Phil Suic') | |
A reaction: But there is, surely, intuition and instinct? Read Keats's Letters. There is good living through upbringing and habit. Read Aristotle. If you like Camus' thought, you will love Chuang Tzu. Personally I am a child of the Enlightenment. |
19638 | Metaphysics is a universalisation of physical anguish [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Every metaphysic begins with an anguish of the body, which then becomes universal. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Underside') | |
A reaction: Not sure if I understand this, but anyone who registers the physical aspect of abstract thought gets a nod of approval from me. |
19620 | Great systems of philosophy are just brilliant tautologies [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The great philosophical systems are no more than brilliant tautologies. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: This makes them sound pointless, but the terms used in the system all have some kind of reference, so the systems are in some way about the world, and not mere private games. At the very least, they are a wonderful branch of poetry. |
23072 | Systems are the worst despotism, in philosophy and in life [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel - three enslavers of the mind. The worst form of despotism is the system, in philosophy and in everything. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 07) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite clear why intellectual 'despotism' is a dreadful crime. I revere Aristotle, partly because he is systematic, but I reject about 30% of what he says. Still, many people agree with this idea. |
23075 | A text explained ceases to be a text [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Why embroider upon what excludes commentary? A text explained is not longer a text. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 09) | |
A reaction: I like that. I'm not a great fan of explicating texts, especially if they are literary, where the whole point is the primary experience, of a novel, poem or play. Philosophy is different, because that is a dialogue between writer and reader. |
19630 | No great idea ever emerged from a dialogue [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Nothing monumental has ever emerged from dialogue, nothing explosive, nothing 'great'. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This may be an argument in favour of dialogue! It smacks of the creepier side of Nietzsche's thinking. I suspect individuals have had many great ideas during dialogues, though not as part of them. Greek schools were all dialogue. |
11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Many definitions have three elements: the term that is defined, an expression containing the defined term (the 'definiendum'), and another expression (the 'definiens') that is equated by the definition with this expression. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2) | |
A reaction: He notes that the definiendum and the definiens are assumed to be in the 'same logical category', which is a right can of worms. |
11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Notable examples of definitions in philosophy have been Plato's (e.g. of piety, in 'Euthyphro'), Anselm's definition of God, the Frege-Russell definition of number, and Tarski's definition of truth. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: All of these are notable for the extensive metaphysical conclusions which then flow from what seems like a fairly neutral definition. We would expect that if we were defining essences, but not if we were just defining word usage. |
11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The 'revision theory' of definitions says definitions impart a hypothetical character, giving a rule of revision rather than a rule of application. ...The output interpretation is better than the input one. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.7) | |
A reaction: Gupta mentions the question of whether such definitions can extend into the trans-finite. |
11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
Full Idea: In a modal logic in which names are non-vacuous and rigid, not only must existence and uniqueness in a definition be shown to hold necessarily, it must be shown that the definiens is satisfied by the same object across possible worlds. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Traditional definitions are generalized identities (so definiendum and definiens can replace each other), in which the sentential is primary (for use in argument), and they involve reduction (and hence eliminability in a ground language). | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.2) |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
Full Idea: A traditional definition requires that the definiendum contains the defined term, that definiendum and definiens are of the same logical category, and the definition is conservative (adding nothing new), and makes elimination possible. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
Full Idea: A definition is 'extensionally adequate' iff there are no actual counterexamples to it. It is 'intensionally adequate' iff there are no possible counterexamples to it. It is 'sense adequate' (or 'analytic') iff it endows the term with the right sense. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.4) |
11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The chemist aims at real definition, whereas the lexicographer aims at nominal definition. ...Perhaps real definitions investigate the thing denoted, and nominal definitions investigate meaning and use. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Very helpful. I really think we should talk much more about the neglected chemists when we discuss science. Theirs is the single most successful branch of science, the paradigm case of what the whole enterprise aims at. |
11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Some definitions aim at precision, others at fairness, or at accuracy, or at clarity, or at fecundity. But if definitions 'give the essence of things' (the Aristotelian formula), then it may not be a unitary kind of activity. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: We don't have to accept this conclusion so quickly. Human interests may shift the emphasis, but there may be a single ideal definition of which these various examples are mere parts. |
11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.3) | |
A reaction: A nice question is how far one can go in stretching received usage. If I define 'democracy' as 'everyone is involved in decisions', that is sort of right, but pushing the boundaries (children, criminals etc). |
11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Ostensive definitions look simple (say 'this stick is one meter long', while showing a stick), but they are effective only because a complex linguistic and conceptual capacity is operative in the background, of which it is hard to give an account. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The full horror of the situation is brought out in Quine's 'gavagai' example (Idea 6312) |
19636 | Truth is just an error insufficiently experienced [Cioran] |
Full Idea: What we call truth is an error insufficiently experienced. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how to go about refuting that claim! Turn the tables, I suppose. 'Tell me, Cioran, are you claiming that this idea is true?' |
19642 | Eventually every 'truth' is guaranteed by the police [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Once a belief is established the police will guarantee its 'truth' sooner or later. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Views') |
14965 | Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The basic principles governing truth are Truth Elimination (sentence A follows from ''A' is true') and the converse Truth Introduction (''A' is true' follows from A), which combine into Tarski's T-schema - 'A' is true if and only if A. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Introduction and Elimination rules are the basic components of natural deduction systems, so 'true' now works in the same way as 'and', 'or' etc. This is the logician's route into truth. |
14968 | A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta] |
Full Idea: If a classical language is expressively weakened - for example, by dispensing with negation - then it can contain its own truth predicate. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.2) | |
A reaction: Thus the Tarskian requirement to move to a metalanguage for truth is only a requirement of a reasonably strong language. Gupta uses this to criticise theories that dispense with the metalanguage. |
11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}. This does captures its essential uses. Pairs <x,y> <u,v> are identical iff x=u and y=v, and the definition satisfies this. Function matters here, not meaning. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is offered as an example of Carnap's 'explications', rather than pure definitions. Quine extols it as a philosophical paradigm (1960:§53). |
9244 | Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus] |
Full Idea: It is always easy to be logical. It is almost impossible to be logical to the bitter end. The only problem that interests me is: is there a logic to the point of death? | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
A reaction: This is a lovely hand grenade to lob into an analytical logic class! It is very hard to get logicians to actually ascribe a clear value to their activity. They tend to present it as a marginal private game, and yet it has high status. |
23066 | Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Negation never proceeds from reasoning but from something much more obscure and old. Arguments come afterward, to justify and sustain it. Every no rises out of the blood. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 02) | |
A reaction: Music to my ears. In the Fregean era no one is allowed to talk about the origins of logical relations in the universal facts of physical existence. You can watch dogs saying no. |
19632 | An axiom has no more authority than a frenzy [Cioran] |
Full Idea: This earth is a place where can confirm anything with an equal likelihood: here axioms and frenzies are interchangeable. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: A perceptive and poetic expression of the modern anti-Euclidean and anti-Fregean view of axioms, as purely formal features of a model or system. |
14964 | The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta] |
Full Idea: There is the idea that the Liar paradox is solved simply by noting that truth is a property of propositions (not of sentences), and the Liar sentence does not express a proposition. But we then say 'I am not now expressing a true proposition'! | |
From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Disappointed to learn this, since I think focusing on propositions (which are unambiguous) rather than sentences solves a huge number of philosophical problems. |
14969 | Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta] |
Full Idea: An example of the Strengthened Liar is the following statement SL: 'Either SL is neither-true-nor-false or it is not true'. This raises a serious problem for any theory that assesses the paradoxes to be neither true nor false. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.4.2) | |
A reaction: If the sentence is either true or false it reduces to the ordinary Liar. If it is neither true nor false, then it is true. |
23077 | The word 'being' is very tempting, but in fact means nothing at all [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Whether it is spoken by a grocer or a philosopher, the word 'being', apparently so rich, so tempting, so charged with significance, in fact means nothing at all; incredible that a man in his right mind can use it on any occasion whatever. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 12) | |
A reaction: I entirely agree. It resembles the redundancy view of 'true' (with which I do not agree). |
23068 | People who really believe anti-realism don't bother to prove it [Cioran] |
Full Idea: When you know quite absolutely that everything is unreal, you then cannot see why you should take the trouble to prove it. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 02) | |
A reaction: Does the same apply to realists? There are at least genuine arguments in both directions. Presumably the thought is that realists have something they care about, but true anti-realists don't. |
23073 | Convictions are failures to study anything thoroughly [Cioran] |
Full Idea: We have convictions only if we have studied nothing thoroughly. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 08) | |
A reaction: Excellent! I cannot imagine studying anything at all in great depth without it resulting in a dwindling expectation of full understanding. Philosophy in spades, but also probably any topic in history. |
23078 | Opinions are fine, but having convictions means something has gone wrong [Cioran] |
Full Idea: To have opinions is inevitable, is natural; to have convictions is less so. Each time I meet someone who has convictions, I wonder what intellectual vice, what flaw has caused him to acquire such a thing. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 12) | |
A reaction: 'The best lack all conviction/ While the worst are full of passionate intensity' (Yeats). I agree with this. Convictions are so often accompanied by anger. |
19626 | Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness! [Cioran] |
Full Idea: How much our instincts must have had to be blunted and their functioning slackened before consciousness extended its control over the sum of our actions and our thoughts! | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Coming') | |
A reaction: Modern wisdom, founded in neuroscience, seems to tell us that the role of consciousness even now is far less than Cioran believed. Once you digest that wisdom, I believe introspection supports it. Still, instinct in animals is much stronger than ours. |
9249 | Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus] |
Full Idea: Knowing whether or not a man is free doesn't interest me. I can only experience my own freedom. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
A reaction: Camus has the right idea. Personally I think you could drop the word 'freedom', and just say that I am confronted by the need to make decisions. |
23076 | If people always acted without words we would take them for robots [Cioran] |
Full Idea: It is because of speech that men give the illusion of being free. If they did - without a word - what they do, we would take them for robots. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 09) | |
A reaction: Love this one. Though it might be said that the power of speech does add an extra dimension of freedom to an action, beyond what any animal could attain. I take the absolute idea of 'being free' to be nonsense. |
9253 | The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus] |
Full Idea: The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Appendix') | |
A reaction: Nice. It might just as much be fate that you live a happy bourgeois life, as that you inadvertently murder your own father at a crossroads. But you can't avoid the powerful awareness of fate when a road accident occurs. |
19633 | We use concepts to master our fears; saying 'death' releases us from confronting it [Cioran] |
Full Idea: It is the use of concepts which makes us master of our fears. We say: Death - and this abstraction releases us from experiencing its infinity, its horror. By baptising events and things, we elude the inexplicable. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: I like this idea. I'm struck by how weird our lives would become if people no longer had names. They are so deeply embedded in our experience that we don't notice them. Imagine if it were taboo to ever name death. |
23065 | If only we could write like a reptile, of endless sensations and no concepts! [Cioran] |
Full Idea: If only we could reach back before the concept, could write on a level with the senses, record the infinitesimal variations of what we touch, do what a reptile would do if it were to set about writing! | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 02) | |
A reaction: A lovely thought. It is a huge effort for us to try to imagine a mental life without concepts. And then to express that mental life in words ..! |
19615 | I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran] |
Full Idea: I want to suppress in myself the reasons men invoke in order to exist, in order to act. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Gamut') | |
A reaction: So much of our inner and moral life concerns not what we think or feel, but what we want to think or feel. The theory of action (if there can be such a thing) must account for these metareasons, which hover over us while we act. |
23071 | We could only be responsible if we had consented before birth to who we are [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The problem of responsibility would have a meaning only if we had been consulted before our birth and had consented to be precisely who we are. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 06) | |
A reaction: The question could still be asked retrospectively, like agreeing to be in an army into which you have been conscripted. People gripped by deeply anti-social desires would probably welcome the chance to become different. |
23070 | We morally dissolve if we spend time with excessive beauty [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Moral disintegration when we spend time in a place that is too beautiful: the self dissolves upon contact with paradise. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 06) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure whether that is true, but it is worth thinking about the value of experiences which are overwhelming. |
19628 | At a civilisation's peak values are all that matters, and people unconsciously live by them [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Epochs of apogee cultivate values for their own sake: life is only a means of realising them; the individual is not aware of living - he lives. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a very Nietzschean thought. Mind you, a crazed and dangerous crowd exhibits the same absorption in simple values. |
9250 | Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus] |
Full Idea: There can be no question of holding forth on ethics. I have seen people behave badly with great morality and I note every day that integrity has no need of rules. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs Man') | |
A reaction: I don't agree. If someone 'behaves badly with great morality' there is something wrong with their morality, and I want to know what it is. The last part is more plausible, and could be a motto for Particularism. Rules dangerously over-simplify life. |
19646 | Values don't accumulate; they are ruthlessly replaced [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Values do not accumulate: a generation contributes something new only by trampling on what was unique in the preceding generation. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'We') | |
A reaction: That may seem true for a Frenchman or a Romanian, but it doesn't feel true of British culture, which seems to me to have accumulated values over the last five hundred years. Before 1500 it seems to me to be a foreign country. We may be near the end! |
9252 | The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus] |
Full Idea: The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Don Juan') | |
A reaction: A penetrating remark, to be placed as a contrary to the remarks of Harry Frankfurt on love. But if the absurd increases the intensity of life, as Camus thinks, then they both make love the great life-affirmation, but in different ways. |
19614 | Lovers are hateful, apart from their hovering awareness of death [Cioran] |
Full Idea: As for lovers, they would be hateful if among their grimaces the presentiment of death did not hover. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Gamut') | |
A reaction: A nice existential corrective, if you were planning to build an ethical system around a rather sentimental idea of love! If you are not gripped by a latent fear that your beloved may die, I doubt whether you are in love. |
9251 | One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus] |
Full Idea: One can be virtuous through a whim. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs Man') | |
A reaction: A nice remark. Obviously neither Aristotle nor Kant would be too impressed by someone who did this, and Aristotle would certainly say that it is not really virtue, but merely right behaviour. I agree with Aristotle. |
19634 | Man is never himself; he always aims at less than life, or more than life [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Able to live only beyond and short of life, man is a prey to two temptation: imbecility and sanctity: sub-man and superman, never himself. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 4 'Threat') | |
A reaction: To me, Taoism embodies imbecility, and spiritual religions embody the superman idea. [This is not Nietzsche's übermensch]. |
19619 | To live authentically, we must see that philosophy is totally useless [Cioran] |
Full Idea: We begin to live authentically only where philosophy ends, at its wreck, when we have understood its terrible nullity, when we have understood that it was futile to resort to it, that it is no help. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: The existentialist dream of trying to find an 'authentic' way of life. That idea means nothing to me. You would need to be utterly immersed in the life of a community with which you identified to live authentically, and that life has almost vanished. |
19622 | The pointlessness of our motives and irrelevance of our gestures reveals our vacuity [Cioran] |
Full Idea: When we realise that no human motive is compatible with infinity, and that no gesture is worth the trouble of making it, our heart, by its very beating, can no longer conceal its vacuity. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Disintoxication') | |
A reaction: An interesting choice of reasons. Nihilism in comparison with infinity, and in comparison with the vastness of society? If you were immortal, and there were only fifty other humans, would that help? |
19617 | Evidence suggests that humans do not have a purpose [Cioran] |
Full Idea: By all evidence, we are in the world to do nothing. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Militant') | |
A reaction: I'm not clear what evidence there could be. Other animals are all enmeshed in a particular environment. As soon as homo sapiens left Africa, it became a baffling phenonomen. I'm not sure what an alligator is in the world for, either. |
19612 | The universe is dirty and fragile, as if a scandal in nothingness had produced its matter [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Everything which is done and undone in the universe bears the stamp of a filthy fragility, as if matter were the fruit of a scandal at the core of nothingness. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Reactionary') | |
A reaction: A gloriously imagined idea, worthy of Shakespeare. By 'scandal' I suppose he implies that the universe is the bastard child of a horrible relationship. A prize exhibit for my 'Nihilism' collection. True nihilists, of course, don't write books. |
9243 | If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus] |
Full Idea: What a man believes to be true must determine his action. Belief in the absurdity of existence must then dictate his conduct. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
A reaction: It is intriguing to speculate what the appropriate conduct is. Presumably it is wild existential gestures, like sticking a knife through your hand. Suicide will be an obvious temptation. But bourgeois life might be equally appropriate. |
6708 | Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus] |
Full Idea: Happiness and the absurd are two sons of the same earth; they are inseparable; it would be a mistake to say that happiness necessarily springs from the absurd discovery; it happens as well that the feeling of the absurd springs from happiness. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], p.110) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand this, but I understand the experience of absurdity, and I can see that somehow one feels a bit more alive when one acknowledges the absurdity of it all. Meta-meta-thought is the highest form of human life, I say. |
19604 | Unlike other creatures, mankind seems lost in nature [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Whereas all beings have their place in nature, man remains a metaphysically straying creature, lost in Life, a stranger to the Creation. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Indirect5') | |
A reaction: Nice challenge to the Aristotelian idea that we can identify the nature and function of man, and derive an ethics from it. This idea seems to state the essence of existentialism, perhaps better than anything in Sartre. We should have stayed in Africa? |
19606 | We can only live because our imagination and memory are poor [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Life is possible only by the deficiencies of our imagination and our memory | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Key') | |
A reaction: Does this mean that we should actually aspire to limit our imaginations and memories? Or are we mercifully intrinsically limited, so that massive intellectual ambition will do no harm? We should be told these things, Cioran! |
19601 | Life is now more dreaded than death [Cioran] |
Full Idea: By dint of accumulating non-mysteries and monopolizing non-meanings, life inspires more dread than death; it is life which is the Great Unknown. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Variations') | |
A reaction: This is the sort of remark we pay continental philosophers to make. |
23074 | In anxiety people cling to what reinforces it, because it is a deep need [Cioran] |
Full Idea: In anxiety, a man clings to whatever can reinforce, can stimulate his providential discomfort: to try to cure him of it is to destroy his equilibrium, anxiety being the basis of his existence and his prosperity. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 09) | |
A reaction: A report from the front line of the age of anxiety, on which I am not qualified to comment. I assume that some anxiety can be a good thing, like nerves before a public performance. |
19640 | No one is brave enough to say they don't want to do anything; we despise such a view [Cioran] |
Full Idea: No one has the audacity to exclaim: 'I don't want to do anything!' - we are more indulgent with a murderer than with a mind emancipated from actions. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'The Architect') | |
A reaction: Perhaps this should be the anti-epigraph for this website. I've slogged away at this project for nineteen years, probably for no other reason than that inactivity appears to be wicked. If I abandoned it, I would invent another project. Sad. |
23069 | Fear cures boredom, because it is stronger [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Fear is the antidote to boredom: the remedy must be stronger than the disease. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 05) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is the motivation of people who indulge in dangerous sports. Maybe all that is need is something daunting, rather than frightening. |
19644 | History is the bloody rejection of boredom [Cioran] |
Full Idea: History is the bloody product of the rejection of boredom. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Views') | |
A reaction: How many absurd and horrible things have been done by people who could not stand being bored? But also, almost everything wonderful has the same source. How did Bach and Shakespeare and Rembrandt feel about boredom? |
19641 | If you lack beliefs, boredom is your martyrdom [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Ennui is the martyrdom of those who live and die for no belief. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Obsequies') |
23062 | It is better to watch the hours pass, than trying to fill them [Cioran] |
Full Idea: I do nothing, granted. But I see the hours pass - which is better than trying to fill them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 01) | |
A reaction: As Nietzsche would have pointed out, this came from a man who regularly wrote books. It is, though, certainly worth asking whether the way we fill our time is better than doing nothing. |
19602 | You are stuck in the past if you don't know boredom [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The man who knows nothing of ennui is still in the world's childhood. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Dislocation') | |
A reaction: Boredom well may be the central experience of existentialism, rather than angst, or nihilism, or the temptations of suicide. |
9242 | Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus] |
Full Idea: The essential problems are those that run the risk of leading to death, or those that intensify the passion of living. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
A reaction: This seems to be distinctively existentialist, in a way that a cool concern for great truths are not ranked as so important. Ranking dangerous problems as crucial seems somehow trivial for a philosopher. Intensity of life is more impressive. |
9246 | Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus] |
Full Idea: The leap of faith does not represent an extreme danger as Kierkegaard would like it to do. The danger, on the contrary, lies in the subtle instant that precedes the leap. Being able to remain on the dizzying crest - that is integrity. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Phil Suic') | |
A reaction: I have always found that a thrilling thought. It perfectly distinguishes atheist existentialism from religious existentialism. It is Camus' best image for how the Absurd can be a life affirming idea, rather than a sort of nihilism. Life gains intensity. |
19613 | It is pointless to refuse or accept the social order; we must endure it like the weather [Cioran] |
Full Idea: It is equally futile to refuse or to accept the social order: we must endure its changes for the better or the worse with a despairing conformism, as we endure birth, love, the weather, and death. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Reactionary') |
19627 | Opportunists can save a nation, and heroes can ruin it [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Opportunists have saved nations; heroes have ruined them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Defense') | |
A reaction: Siegfried smashes the staff of Wotan. Napoleon looks like a hero, but he increasingly looks like the single most disastrous figure ever to have emerged in Europe. It took the Germans till 1940 to avenge what he did. |
19625 | The ideal is to impose a religion by force, and then live in doubt about its beliefs [Cioran] |
Full Idea: To belong to a church uncertain of its god - after once imposing that god by fire and sword - should be the ideal of every detached mind. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Felicity') | |
A reaction: I'm trying hard to think of an adequate response to this. I'll get back to you.... |
19605 | Despite endless suggestions, no one has found a goal for history [Cioran] |
Full Idea: No one has found a valid goal for history; but everyone has proposed one. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Indirect') | |
A reaction: This seems to be an attack on the Hegelian idea of destiny that suffused both marxism and fascism in the 1930s. |
19637 | History is wonderfully devoid of meaning [Cioran] |
Full Idea: That History has no meaning is what should delight our hearts. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: I have just read a history of the Wars of the Roses, and I wholeheartedly endorse Cioran's view. |
19610 | Religions see suicide as insubordination [Cioran] |
Full Idea: If the religions have forbidden us to die by our own hand, it is because they saw that such practices set an example of insubordination which humiliated temples and gods alike. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Resources') | |
A reaction: Has anyone ever committed suicide in a cathedral (even during a service)? How many bishops, cardinals, rabbis etc have committed suicide? It is not uncommon among priests in the lower echelons. |
19611 | No one has ever found a good argument against suicide [Cioran] |
Full Idea: No church, no civil institution has as yet invented a single argument valid against suicide. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Resources') | |
A reaction: Suicide in young people usually looks like an error of judgement (in quiet moments of history). You need more inductive evidence that life is going to be irremediably awful. But if life is fine but they choose suicide anyway, what can you say? |
19609 | If you have not contemplated suicide, you are a miserable worm [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The man who has never imagined his own annihilation, who has not anticipated recourse to the rope, the bullet, poison, or the sea, is a degraded galley slave or a worm crawling upon the cosmic carrion. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1'Resources') | |
A reaction: I guess by this date everyone in Paris had read Camus' 'The Myth of Sisyphus', so suicide was the main topic in the cafés. I sort of agree with it. The possibility of suicide is part of the examined life. |
23067 | Suicide is pointless, because it always comes too late [Cioran] |
Full Idea: It's not worth the bother of killing yourself, since you always kill yourself too late. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 02) | |
A reaction: A neat thought, but unlikely to be true for those who commit suicide, which presumably results from a sustained and apparently incurable situation. |
9248 | It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus] |
Full Idea: It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will. Suicide is a repudiation. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
A reaction: Camus' whole book addresses the question of suicide. He suggests that life can be redeemed and become livable if you squarely face up to the absurdity of it, and the gap between what we hope for and what we get. |
19639 | We all need sexual secrets! [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Woe to those who have no sexual secrets! | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Wonders') |
19603 | Why is God so boring, and why does God resemble humanity so little? [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Why is God so dull, so feeble, so inadequately picturesque? Why does He lack interest, vigor, actuality and resemble us so little? Is there any image less anthropomorphic and more gratuitously remote? | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Devil') | |
A reaction: This seems to be directed at those like Feuerbach who said that we had merely created God as a glorified image of humanity. |
19616 | As the perfect wisdom of detachment, philosophy offers no rivals to Taoism [Cioran] |
Full Idea: China alone long since arrived at a refined wisdom superior to philosophy: Taoism surpasses all the mind has conceived by way of detachment. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Militant') | |
A reaction: Personally I dislike Taoism, which seems to advocate a sort of suicide within life. But given Cioran's evident state of mind, I can see its attractions. If this country deteriorates any further [I write on 4th July 2016], I may turn to Taoism. |
19600 | When man abandons religion, he then follows new fake gods and mythologies [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Even when he turns from religion, man remains subject to it; depleting himself to create fake gods, he then feverishly adopts them: his need for fiction, for mythology triumphs over evidence and absurdity alike. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Genealogy') | |
A reaction: Cioran had just lived through the high water mark of communism and fascism. I don't think modern atheists fit this description very well. |
19643 | A religion needs to motivate killings, and cannot tolerate rivals [Cioran] |
Full Idea: A religion dies when it tolerates truths which exclude it; and the god in whose name one no longer kills is dead indeed. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Views') | |
A reaction: I fear that in our time we have people who are killing in the name of their religion as a last resort to try to convince themselves that their religion is not dying. It is startlingly how religion can now be publicly mocked. Unthinkable 50 years ago. |
23063 | The first man obviously found paradise unendurable [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Paradise was unendurable, otherwise the first man would have adapted to it. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 01) | |
A reaction: Seems a bit harsh. There was evidently one aspect that was missing (knowledge), and he was surprised to find himself ejected for wanting it. Like a holiday in a Mediterranean hotel, with good food. |
19623 | Circles of hell are ridiculous; all that matters is to be there [Cioran] |
Full Idea: What a preposterous notion, to draw circles in hell, to make the intensity of the flames vary in its compartments, to hierarchise its torments! The important thing is to be there. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], '1 'La Perduta') |