59 ideas
| 9247 | Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus] |
| Full Idea: Life will be lived all the better if it has no meaning. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
| A reaction: One image of the good life is that of a successful wild animal, for which existence is not a problem, merely a constant activity and pursuit. Maybe life begins to acquire meaning once we realise that meaning should not be sought directly. |
| 6707 | Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus] |
| Full Idea: There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judgine whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], p.11) | |
| A reaction: What a wonderful thesis for a book. In Idea 2682 there is the possibility of life being worth living, but not worth a huge amount of effort. It is better to call Camus' question the first question, rather than the only question. |
| 9245 | To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus] |
| Full Idea: To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Phil Suic') | |
| A reaction: But there is, surely, intuition and instinct? Read Keats's Letters. There is good living through upbringing and habit. Read Aristotle. If you like Camus' thought, you will love Chuang Tzu. Personally I am a child of the Enlightenment. |
| 15716 | If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: If the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each other with all their consequences, then they are true and the things defined by the axioms exist. For me this is the criterion of truth and existence. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Letter to Frege 29.12.1899 [1899]), quoted by R Kaplan / E Kaplan - The Art of the Infinite 2 'Mind' | |
| A reaction: If an axiom says something equivalent to 'fairies exist, but they are totally undetectable', this would seem to avoid contradiction with anything, and hence be true. Hilbert's idea sounds crazy to me. He developed full Formalism later. |
| 9244 | Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus] |
| Full Idea: It is always easy to be logical. It is almost impossible to be logical to the bitter end. The only problem that interests me is: is there a logic to the point of death? | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
| A reaction: This is a lovely hand grenade to lob into an analytical logic class! It is very hard to get logicians to actually ascribe a clear value to their activity. They tend to present it as a marginal private game, and yet it has high status. |
| 18844 | You would cripple mathematics if you denied Excluded Middle [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: Taking the principle of Excluded Middle away from the mathematician would be the same, say, as prohibiting the astronomer from using the telescope or the boxer from using his fists. | |
| From: David Hilbert (The Foundations of Mathematics [1927], p.476), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 9.4 | |
| A reaction: [p.476 in Van Heijenoort] |
| 17963 | The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The facts of geometry order themselves into a geometry, the facts of arithmetic into a theory of numbers, the facts of statics, electrodynamics into a theory of statics, electrodynamics, or the facts of the physics of gases into a theory of gases. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [03]) | |
| A reaction: This is the confident (I would say 'essentialist') view of axioms, which received a bit of a setback with Gödel's Theorems. I certainly agree that the world proposes an order to us - we don't just randomly invent one that suits us. |
| 17966 | Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: If a theory is to serve its purpose of orienting and ordering, it must first give us an overview of the independence and dependence of its propositions, and second give a guarantee of the consistency of all of the propositions. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [09]) | |
| A reaction: Gödel's Second theorem showed that the theory can never prove its own consistency, which made the second Hilbert requirement more difficult. It is generally assumed that each of the axioms must be independent of the others. |
| 8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert wanted to derive ideal mathematics from the secure, paradox-free, finite mathematics (known as 'Hilbert's Programme'). ...Note that for the realist consistency is not something we need to prove; it is a precondition of thought. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900], 6.7) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics | |
| A reaction: I am an intuitive realist, though I am not so sure about that on cautious reflection. Compare the claims that there are reasons or causes for everything. Reality cannot contain contradicitions (can it?). Contradictions would be our fault. |
| 12456 | I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184) | |
| A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the famous Hilbert Programme, which is said to have been brought to an abrupt end by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. |
| 12461 | We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The thesis that every mathematical problem is solvable - we are all convinced that it really is so. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.200) | |
| A reaction: This will include, for example, Goldbach's Conjecture (every even is the sum of two primes), which is utterly simple but with no proof anywhere in sight. |
| 13472 | Hilbert aimed to eliminate number from geometry [Hilbert, by Hart,WD] |
| Full Idea: One of Hilbert's aims in 'The Foundations of Geometry' was to eliminate number [as measure of lengths and angles] from geometry. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |
| A reaction: Presumably this would particularly have to include the elimination of ratios (rather than actual specific lengths). |
| 9633 | No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.191), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
| A reaction: This is Hilbert's famous refusal to accept any account of mathematics, such as Kant's, which excludes actual infinities. Cantor had laid out a whole glorious hierarchy of different infinities. |
| 12460 | We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: To preserve the simple formal rules of ordinary Aristotelian logic, we must supplement the finitary statements with ideal statements. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.195) | |
| A reaction: I find very appealing the picture of mathematics as rooted in the physical world, and then gradually extended by a series of 'idealisations', which should perhaps be thought of as fictions. |
| 12462 | Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: Operating with the infinite can be made certain only by the finitary. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.201) | |
| A reaction: See 'Compactness' for one aspect of this claim. I think Hilbert was fighting a rearguard action, and his idea now has few followers. |
| 12455 | The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: Just as in the limit processes of the infinitesimal calculus, the infinitely large and small proved to be a mere figure of speech, so too we must realise that the infinite in the sense of an infinite totality, used in deductive methods, is an illusion. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184) | |
| A reaction: This is a very authoritative rearguard action. I no longer think the dispute matters much, it being just a dispute over a proposed new meaning for the word 'number'. |
| 12457 | There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: A homogeneous continuum which admits of the sort of divisibility needed to realise the infinitely small is nowhere to be found in reality. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.186) | |
| A reaction: He makes this remark as a response to Planck's new quantum theory (the year before the big works of Heisenberg and Schrödinger). Personally I don't see why infinities should depend on the physical world, since they are imaginary. |
| 17967 | To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to study the essence of mathematical proof itself if one wishes to answer such questions as the one about decidability in a finite number of operations. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [53]) |
| 9546 | Euclid axioms concerns possibilities of construction, but Hilbert's assert the existence of objects [Hilbert, by Chihara] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert's geometrical axioms were existential in character, asserting the existence of certain geometrical objects (points and lines). Euclid's postulates do not assert the existence of anything; they assert the possibility of certain constructions. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 01.1 | |
| A reaction: Chihara says geometry was originally understood modally, but came to be understood existentially. It seems extraordinary to me that philosophers of mathematics can have become more platonist over the centuries. |
| 18742 | Hilbert's formalisation revealed implicit congruence axioms in Euclid [Hilbert, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| Full Idea: In his formal investigation of Euclidean geometry, Hilbert uncovered congruence axioms that implicitly played a role in Euclid's proofs but were not explicitly recognised. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R - Mathematical Methods in Philosophy 2 | |
| A reaction: The writers are offering this as a good example of the benefits of a precise and formal approach to foundational questions. It's hard to disagree, but dispiriting if you need a PhD in maths before you can start doing philosophy. |
| 18217 | Hilbert's geometry is interesting because it captures Euclid without using real numbers [Hilbert, by Field,H] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert's formulation of the Euclidean theory is of special interest because (besides being rigorously axiomatised) it does not employ the real numbers in the axioms. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Hartry Field - Science without Numbers 3 | |
| A reaction: Notice that this job was done by Hilbert, and not by the fictionalist Hartry Field. |
| 17965 | The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The linearity of the equation of the plane and of the orthogonal transformation of point-coordinates is completely adequate to produce the whole broad science of spatial Euclidean geometry purely by means of analysis. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [05]) | |
| A reaction: This remark comes from the man who succeeded in producing modern axioms for geometry (in 1897), so he knows what he is talking about. We should not be wholly pessimistic about Hilbert's ambitious projects. He had to dig deeper than this idea... |
| 17964 | Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The laws of calculation and the rules of integers suffice for the construction of number theory. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [05]) | |
| A reaction: This is the confident Hilbert view that the whole system can be fully spelled out. Gödel made this optimism more difficult. |
| 17697 | The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The standpoint of pure experience seems to me to be refuted by the objection that the existence, possible or actual, of an arbitrarily large number can never be derived through experience, that is, through experiment. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic [1904], p.130) | |
| A reaction: Alternatively, empiricism refutes infinite numbers! No modern mathematician will accept that, but you wonder in what sense the proposed entities qualify as 'numbers'. |
| 17698 | Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: In the traditional exposition of the laws of logic certain fundamental arithmetic notions are already used, for example in the notion of set, and to some extent also of number. Thus we turn in a circle, and a partly simultaneous development is required. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic [1904], p.131) | |
| A reaction: If the Axiom of Infinity is meant, it may be possible to purge the arithmetic from the logic. Then the challenge to derive arithmetic from it becomes rather tougher. |
| 10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The solid philosophical attitude that I think is required for the grounding of pure mathematics is this: In the beginning was the sign. | |
| From: David Hilbert (works [1900]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Why did people invent those particular signs? Presumably they were meant to designate something, in the world or in our experience. |
| 10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert replaced a semantic construal of inconsistency (that the theory entails a statement that is necessarily false) by a syntactic one (that the theory formally derives the statement (0 =1 ∧ 0 not-= 1). | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Finding one particular clash will pinpoint the notion of inconsistency, but it doesn't seem to define what it means, since the concept has very wide application. |
| 22293 | Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency [Hilbert, by Potter] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert proposed to circuvent the paradoxes by means of the doctrine (already proposed by Poincaré) that in mathematics consistency entails existence. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (On the Concept of Number [1900], p.183) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 19 'Exist' | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Hilbert's idea has struck me as weird, but it makes sense if its main motive is to block the paradoxes. Roughly, the idea is 'it exists if it isn't paradoxical'. A low bar for existence (but then it is only in mathematics!). |
| 12459 | The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The subject matter of mathematics is the concrete symbols themselves whose structure is immediately clear and recognisable. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.192) | |
| A reaction: I don't think many people will agree with Hilbert here. Does he mean token-symbols or type-symbols? You can do maths in your head, or with different symbols. If type-symbols, you have to explain what a type is. |
| 10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert's project was to establish the consistency of classical mathematics using just finitary means, to convince all parties that no contradictions will follow from employing the infinitary notions and reasoning. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: This is the project which was badly torpedoed by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. |
| 18112 | Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: We can conceive mathematics to be a stock of two kinds of formulas: first, those to which the meaningful communications of finitary statements correspond; and secondly, other formulas which signify nothing and which are ideal structures of our theory. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.196), quoted by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.1 |
| 9636 | My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: This dream is famous for being shattered by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem a mere six years later. Neverless there seem to be more limited certainties which are accepted in mathematics. The certainty of the whole of arithmetic is beyond us. |
| 9249 | Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus] |
| Full Idea: Knowing whether or not a man is free doesn't interest me. I can only experience my own freedom. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
| A reaction: Camus has the right idea. Personally I think you could drop the word 'freedom', and just say that I am confronted by the need to make decisions. |
| 9253 | The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus] |
| Full Idea: The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Appendix') | |
| A reaction: Nice. It might just as much be fate that you live a happy bourgeois life, as that you inadvertently murder your own father at a crossroads. But you can't avoid the powerful awareness of fate when a road accident occurs. |
| 20289 | Ethics is universalisable - it must involve an impartial and universal view of things [Singer] |
| Full Idea: A distinguishng feature of ethics is that ethical judgements are universalisable. Ethics requires us to go beyond our own personal point of view to a standpoint like that of the impartial spectator who takes a universal point of view. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 10) | |
| A reaction: I'm thinking that ethical agents are more 'situated' than that. Suppose a finance minister stole billions in tax and gave it to a poor country. Good from the universal angle, perhaps, but a shocking betrayal of his own community. |
| 9250 | Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus] |
| Full Idea: There can be no question of holding forth on ethics. I have seen people behave badly with great morality and I note every day that integrity has no need of rules. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs Man') | |
| A reaction: I don't agree. If someone 'behaves badly with great morality' there is something wrong with their morality, and I want to know what it is. The last part is more plausible, and could be a motto for Particularism. Rules dangerously over-simplify life. |
| 20286 | Following an inner voice for morality is irresponsible in a rational agent [Singer] |
| Full Idea: When following conscience means doing as one's 'internal voice' prompts one to do, to follow one's conscience it so abdicate one's responsibility as a rational agent. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 09) | |
| A reaction: Seems dead right. An inner voice is far more likely to be your culture and upbringing than to be an absolute moral truth. It may not be entirely wrong, though, to behave as your culture requires. |
| 20282 | The sanctity of a human life depends either on being of our species, or on being a person [Singer] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of the sanctity of human life has two separate claims, one that there is a special value in the life of a member of our species, and the other that there is a special value in the life of a person. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 04) |
| 9252 | The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus] |
| Full Idea: The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Don Juan') | |
| A reaction: A penetrating remark, to be placed as a contrary to the remarks of Harry Frankfurt on love. But if the absurd increases the intensity of life, as Camus thinks, then they both make love the great life-affirmation, but in different ways. |
| 20278 | 'Marginal utility' says something is more useful if it is in short supply [Singer] |
| Full Idea: The economic principle of marginal utility states that for a given individual a set amount of something is more useful when the individual has little of it than when he has a lot. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 02) | |
| A reaction: But individuals may very a lot on this one. 'He can't get enough of X'. I may be desperate to buy 10,000 books, but you may consider such a need ridiculous, so who decides? |
| 20281 | Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me? [Singer] |
| Full Idea: Most striking is the impact of the contract model on our attitude to future generations. 'Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me?' would be the view we ought to take. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 03) | |
| A reaction: I should bury my mobile phone for future archaeologists, because it will be more valuable then than it is now. Singer cites the disposal of nuclear waste as an instance. |
| 9251 | One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus] |
| Full Idea: One can be virtuous through a whim. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs Man') | |
| A reaction: A nice remark. Obviously neither Aristotle nor Kant would be too impressed by someone who did this, and Aristotle would certainly say that it is not really virtue, but merely right behaviour. I agree with Aristotle. |
| 20276 | Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer] |
| Full Idea: Those who think ethics is a system of rules can rescue their position by finding more complicated and more specific rules which do not conflict, or by ranking the rules in some hierarchical structure to resolve conflicts. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 01) | |
| A reaction: The problem is that clear-cut rules seem to produce conflicts. I would have thought that more specific rules would increase that problem. Safety is in generality. |
| 9243 | If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus] |
| Full Idea: What a man believes to be true must determine his action. Belief in the absurdity of existence must then dictate his conduct. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
| A reaction: It is intriguing to speculate what the appropriate conduct is. Presumably it is wild existential gestures, like sticking a knife through your hand. Suicide will be an obvious temptation. But bourgeois life might be equally appropriate. |
| 6708 | Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus] |
| Full Idea: Happiness and the absurd are two sons of the same earth; they are inseparable; it would be a mistake to say that happiness necessarily springs from the absurd discovery; it happens as well that the feeling of the absurd springs from happiness. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], p.110) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand this, but I understand the experience of absurdity, and I can see that somehow one feels a bit more alive when one acknowledges the absurdity of it all. Meta-meta-thought is the highest form of human life, I say. |
| 20290 | Psychopaths may just be bored, because they cannot participate in normal emotional life [Singer] |
| Full Idea: Maybe psychopaths are bored because their emotional poverty means that they cannot take interest in, or gain satisfaction from, what for others are the most important things in life: love, family, success in business or professional life, etc. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 10) | |
| A reaction: [he cites Hervey Cleckley for this] Maybe boredom is a symptom of some human inadequacy, but it might sometimes be a mark of superiority. It drives people to both creation and destruction. Quite a good account of criminal behaviour. |
| 9242 | Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus] |
| Full Idea: The essential problems are those that run the risk of leading to death, or those that intensify the passion of living. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
| A reaction: This seems to be distinctively existentialist, in a way that a cool concern for great truths are not ranked as so important. Ranking dangerous problems as crucial seems somehow trivial for a philosopher. Intensity of life is more impressive. |
| 9246 | Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus] |
| Full Idea: The leap of faith does not represent an extreme danger as Kierkegaard would like it to do. The danger, on the contrary, lies in the subtle instant that precedes the leap. Being able to remain on the dizzying crest - that is integrity. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Phil Suic') | |
| A reaction: I have always found that a thrilling thought. It perfectly distinguishes atheist existentialism from religious existentialism. It is Camus' best image for how the Absurd can be a life affirming idea, rather than a sort of nihilism. Life gains intensity. |
| 20288 | You can't condemn violent revolution without assessing the evils it prevents [Singer] |
| Full Idea: It would be one-sided to say that violent revolution is always absolutely wrong, without taking account of the evils that the revolutionaries are trying to stop. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 09) | |
| A reaction: This seems like common sense, but there are plenty of right-wing authoritarians who would claim that stable authority has priority over all social wrongs. I think that view is mistaken. But the problem is, how to know the future? |
| 21997 | In Marxism the state will be superseded [Singer] |
| Full Idea: It is a famous Marxist doctrine that the state will be superseded. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Marx [1980], 9) | |
| A reaction: Why is that final state communism rather than anarchism? |
| 20287 | If 49% of the population can be wrong, so can 51% [Singer] |
| Full Idea: The case for majority rule should not be overstated. No sensible democrat would claim that the majority is always right. If 49% of the population can be wrong, so can 51%. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 09) | |
| A reaction: Well said! We can't possibly put a figure on when the majority become right. In the recent Brexit referendum hardly anyone seemed to understand the issues very well, so none of us have a clue about who was right. |
| 21993 | Materialist history says we are subject to incomprehensible forces [Singer] |
| Full Idea: The materialist conception of history tells us that human beings are totally subject to forces they do not understand and control. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Marx [1980], 6) | |
| A reaction: How does Marx know the forces? An exceptionally influential idea, because it is a modern commonplace that we have very little control over our own lives (apart from right wingers asserting that 'you can have anything if you really really want it'). |
| 20277 | Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer] |
| Full Idea: Equal consideration of interests is a minimal principle of equality in the sense that it does not dictate equal treatment. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 02) | |
| A reaction: Do those convicted of serious crime retain equal interests? Should a huge group of people sacrifice all of their interests, because of the powerful interests of one person? |
| 20279 | Equality of opportunity unfairly rewards those lucky enough to have great ability [Singer] |
| Full Idea: Equality of opportunity is not an attractive ideal. It rewards the lucky, who inherit those abilities that allow them to pursue interesting and lucrative careers. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 02) | |
| A reaction: He makes it sound like cheating. Singer has a highly individualistic view, but society as a whole needs the development of talent, wherever it can be found. |
| 20285 | If a right entails having the relevant desire, many creatures might have no right to life [Singer] |
| Full Idea: If to have a right one must have the ability to desire that to which one has a right, then to have a right to life one must be able to desire one's own continued existence. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 07) | |
| A reaction: The unborn, small infants, and persons in comas may well lack the relevant desire (at least consciously - arguably even a plant has a non-conscious 'desire' or drive for life). The idea that a right entails a conscious desire seems daft. |
| 20284 | Why should a potential person have the rights of an actual person? [Singer] |
| Full Idea: A prince may be a potential king, but he does not have the rights of a king. Why should a potential person have the rights of a person? | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 06) | |
| A reaction: But the prince is probably accorded special rights, merely on the grounds that he is the potential king. An unborn potential king is always considered as special. |
| 9248 | It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus] |
| Full Idea: It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will. Suicide is a repudiation. | |
| From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
| A reaction: Camus' whole book addresses the question of suicide. He suggests that life can be redeemed and become livable if you squarely face up to the absurdity of it, and the gap between what we hope for and what we get. |
| 20283 | Killing a chimp is worse than killing a human too defective to be a person [Singer] |
| Full Idea: It seems that killing a chimpanzee is worse than the killing of a gravely defective human who is not a person. ...[p.103] the effects on relatives of the defective human will sometimes constitute additional indirect reasons against killing the human. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 05) | |
| A reaction: Singer's most notorious idea. Perhaps we should all carry cards (perhaps combined with donor cards) saying how many people will care if we die. |
| 17968 | By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: By pushing ahead to ever deeper layers of axioms ...we also win ever-deeper insights into the essence of scientific thought itself, and become ever more conscious of the unity of our knowledge. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [56]) | |
| A reaction: This is the less fashionable idea that scientific essentialism can also be applicable in the mathematic sciences, centring on the project of axiomatisation for logic, arithmetic, sets etc. |