29 ideas
9247 | Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus] |
Full Idea: Life will be lived all the better if it has no meaning. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
A reaction: One image of the good life is that of a successful wild animal, for which existence is not a problem, merely a constant activity and pursuit. Maybe life begins to acquire meaning once we realise that meaning should not be sought directly. |
6707 | Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus] |
Full Idea: There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judgine whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], p.11) | |
A reaction: What a wonderful thesis for a book. In Idea 2682 there is the possibility of life being worth living, but not worth a huge amount of effort. It is better to call Camus' question the first question, rather than the only question. |
9245 | To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus] |
Full Idea: To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Phil Suic') | |
A reaction: But there is, surely, intuition and instinct? Read Keats's Letters. There is good living through upbringing and habit. Read Aristotle. If you like Camus' thought, you will love Chuang Tzu. Personally I am a child of the Enlightenment. |
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
Full Idea: The sheer lack of structure demanded by truthmaker theorists means that it is easier to run model-theoretic arguments against them than against correspondence theorists. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 02.3) | |
A reaction: Truthmaking is a vague relation, where correspondence is fairly specific. Model arguments say you can keep the sentences steady, but shuffle around what they refer to. |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
Full Idea: According to the coherence theory of truth, for our thoughts to be true is not for them to be about objects, but only for them to cohere with one another. This is rather terrifying. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 14.2) | |
A reaction: Davidson espoused this view in 1983, but then gave it up. It strikes me as either a daft view of truth, or a denial of truth. The coherence theory of justification, on the other hand, is correct. |
9244 | Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus] |
Full Idea: It is always easy to be logical. It is almost impossible to be logical to the bitter end. The only problem that interests me is: is there a logic to the point of death? | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
A reaction: This is a lovely hand grenade to lob into an analytical logic class! It is very hard to get logicians to actually ascribe a clear value to their activity. They tend to present it as a marginal private game, and yet it has high status. |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
Full Idea: The Permutation Theorem says that any theory with a non-trivial model has many distinct isomorphic models with the same domain. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 02.1) | |
A reaction: This may be the most significant claim of model theory, since Putnam has erected an argument for anti-realism on it. See the ideas of Tim Button. |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
Full Idea: External realists have three principles: Independence - the world is objects that are independent of mind, language and theory; Correspondence - truth involves some correspondence of thoughts and things; Cartesian - an ideal theory might be false. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 01.1-3) | |
A reaction: [compressed; he cites Descartes's Demon for the third] Button is setting these up as targets. I subscribe to all three, in some form or other. Of course, as a theory approaches the success implying it is 'ideal', it becomes highly likely to be accurate. |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
Full Idea: Indeterminacy arguments aim to show that if there is any way to make a theory true, then there are many ways to do so. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 02.1) | |
A reaction: Button says the simplest indeterminacy argument is Putnam's Permutation Argument - that you can shuffle the objects in a formal model, without affecting truth. But do we belief that metaphysics can be settled in this sort of way? |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
Full Idea: If realists think an ideal theory could be false, then the theory is consistent, and hence complete, and hence finitely modellable, and hence it is guaranteed that there is some way to make it true. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 02.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This challenges the realists' supposed claim that even the most ideal of theories could possibly be false. Presumably for a theory to be 'ideal' is not all-or-nothing. Are we capable of creating a fully ideal theory? [Löwenheim-Skolem] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
Full Idea: Cartesian scepticism agonises over whether our beliefs are true or false, whereas Kantian scepticism agonises over how it is even possible for beliefs to be true or false. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 07.2) | |
A reaction: Kant's question is, roughly, 'how can our thoughts succeed in being about the world?' Kantian scepticism is the more drastic, and looks vulnerable to a turning of the tables, but asking how Kantian worries can even be expressed. |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
Full Idea: The empirical 'content' of a theory is all its observable predictions. Two theories with the same predictions are empirically 'equivalent'. A theory which gets it all right at this level is empirically 'adequate'. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 05.1) |
9249 | Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus] |
Full Idea: Knowing whether or not a man is free doesn't interest me. I can only experience my own freedom. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
A reaction: Camus has the right idea. Personally I think you could drop the word 'freedom', and just say that I am confronted by the need to make decisions. |
9253 | The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus] |
Full Idea: The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Appendix') | |
A reaction: Nice. It might just as much be fate that you live a happy bourgeois life, as that you inadvertently murder your own father at a crossroads. But you can't avoid the powerful awareness of fate when a road accident occurs. |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
Full Idea: A sentence's truth conditions comprise an exhaustive list of the situations in which that sentence would be true. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 03.4) | |
A reaction: So to know its meaning you must know those conditions? Compare 'my cat is licking my finger' with 'dramatic events are happening in Ethiopia'. It should take an awful long time to grasp the second sentence. |
9250 | Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus] |
Full Idea: There can be no question of holding forth on ethics. I have seen people behave badly with great morality and I note every day that integrity has no need of rules. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs Man') | |
A reaction: I don't agree. If someone 'behaves badly with great morality' there is something wrong with their morality, and I want to know what it is. The last part is more plausible, and could be a motto for Particularism. Rules dangerously over-simplify life. |
2854 | Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Prescriptivism holds that if you think one 'ought' to do a certain kind of act, and yet you are not committed to doing that act in the relevant circumstances, then you either spoke insincerely, or are using the word 'ought' in a weak sense. | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640) | |
A reaction: So that's an 'ought', but not a 'genuine ought', then? (No True Scotsman move). Someone ought to rescue that drowning child, but I can't be bothered. |
9252 | The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus] |
Full Idea: The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Don Juan') | |
A reaction: A penetrating remark, to be placed as a contrary to the remarks of Harry Frankfurt on love. But if the absurd increases the intensity of life, as Camus thinks, then they both make love the great life-affirmation, but in different ways. |
2856 | Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Prescriptivity is especially important if moral judgements are universalizable, for then we can employ golden rule-style reasoning ('do as you would be done by'). | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640) |
9251 | One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus] |
Full Idea: One can be virtuous through a whim. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs Man') | |
A reaction: A nice remark. Obviously neither Aristotle nor Kant would be too impressed by someone who did this, and Aristotle would certainly say that it is not really virtue, but merely right behaviour. I agree with Aristotle. |
20883 | Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Most utilitarians now think that pleasure, even if construed widely, is not the only thing desirable in itself. ...Goods also include important knowledge, friendship, autonomy, achievement and so on. | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 2) | |
A reaction: That pleasure is desired is empirically verifiable, which certainly motivated Bentham. A string of other desirables each needs to be justified - but how? What would be the value of a 'friendship' if neither party got pleasure from it? |
20884 | Rule-utilitarians prevent things like torture, even on rare occasions when it seems best [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: For rule-utilitarians acts of murder, torture and so on, can be impermissible even in rare cases where they really would produce better consequences than any alternative act. | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 4) | |
A reaction: It is basic to rule-utilitarianism that it trumps act-ulitilarianism, even when a particular act wins the utilitarian calculation. But that is hard to understand. Only long-term benefit could justify the rule - but that should win the calculation. |
9243 | If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus] |
Full Idea: What a man believes to be true must determine his action. Belief in the absurdity of existence must then dictate his conduct. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
A reaction: It is intriguing to speculate what the appropriate conduct is. Presumably it is wild existential gestures, like sticking a knife through your hand. Suicide will be an obvious temptation. But bourgeois life might be equally appropriate. |
6708 | Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus] |
Full Idea: Happiness and the absurd are two sons of the same earth; they are inseparable; it would be a mistake to say that happiness necessarily springs from the absurd discovery; it happens as well that the feeling of the absurd springs from happiness. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], p.110) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand this, but I understand the experience of absurdity, and I can see that somehow one feels a bit more alive when one acknowledges the absurdity of it all. Meta-meta-thought is the highest form of human life, I say. |
9242 | Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus] |
Full Idea: The essential problems are those that run the risk of leading to death, or those that intensify the passion of living. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs and Suic') | |
A reaction: This seems to be distinctively existentialist, in a way that a cool concern for great truths are not ranked as so important. Ranking dangerous problems as crucial seems somehow trivial for a philosopher. Intensity of life is more impressive. |
9246 | Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus] |
Full Idea: The leap of faith does not represent an extreme danger as Kierkegaard would like it to do. The danger, on the contrary, lies in the subtle instant that precedes the leap. Being able to remain on the dizzying crest - that is integrity. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Phil Suic') | |
A reaction: I have always found that a thrilling thought. It perfectly distinguishes atheist existentialism from religious existentialism. It is Camus' best image for how the Absurd can be a life affirming idea, rather than a sort of nihilism. Life gains intensity. |
20885 | Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Six types of euthanasia: 1) Active voluntary (knowing my wishes), 2) Active non-voluntary (not knowing my wishes), 3) Active involuntary (against my wishes), 4) Passive voluntary, 5) Passive non-voluntary, 6) Passive involuntary. | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 5) | |
A reaction: 'Active' is intervening, and 'passive' is not intervening. A helpful framework. |
20882 | Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Passive euthanasia is arguably not killing, and the death involved is often painful, so let us take the term 'euthanasia' to mean 'either killing or passing up opportunities to save someone, out of concern for that person'. | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 1) | |
A reaction: This sounds good, and easily settled, until you think concern for that person could have two different outcomes, depending on whether the criteria are those of the decider or of the patient. Think of religious decider and atheist patient, or vice versa. |
9248 | It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus] |
Full Idea: It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will. Suicide is a repudiation. | |
From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free') | |
A reaction: Camus' whole book addresses the question of suicide. He suggests that life can be redeemed and become livable if you squarely face up to the absurdity of it, and the gap between what we hope for and what we get. |