Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Albert Casullo, Stephen Hetherington and Antoine Arnauld

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9 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
16519 No one can conceive of a possible substance, apart from those which God has created [Arnauld]
     Full Idea: I am much mistaken if there is anyone who dares to say that he can conceive of a purely possible substance, …for although one talks so much of them, one never conceives them except according to the notion of those which God has created.
     From: Antoine Arnauld (Letters to Leibniz [1686], 1686.05.13), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance 4.2
     A reaction: This idea cashes out in the 'necessitism' of Tim Williamson, and views on the Barcan formulae in modal logic.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
20475 Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
     Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
     A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
20476 If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
     Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
     A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
20471 Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
     Full Idea: There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2)
     A reaction: [compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty.
20477 The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
     Full Idea: The leading claim of proponents of the a priori is that sources of justification are of two significantly different types: experiential and nonexperiential. Initially this difference is marked at the phenomenological level.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 5)
     A reaction: He cites Plantinga and Bealer for the phenomenological starting point (that some knowledge just seems rationally obvious, certain, and perhaps necessary).
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
20472 Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo]
     Full Idea: There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
3913 Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo]
     Full Idea: Some maintain that experiments in imagination are the source of a priori justification.
     From: Albert Casullo (A priori/A posteriori [1992], p.1)
     A reaction: What else could assessments of possibility and necessity be based on except imagination?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
20474 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo]
     Full Idea: A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40)
     A reaction: Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19699 A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
     Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified.
     From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5)
     A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome.