201 ideas
2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is the domain where different languages, theories, explanations, and conceptual systems come together and have their mutual ontological relationships sorted out and clarified. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.066) |
19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
Full Idea: For some people metaphysics is a general theory of objects (ontology) - a discipline which is to be developed in a purely empirical way, and which differs from other empirical disciplines in its generality. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 19) | |
A reaction: Tarski says some people despise it, but for him such metaphysics is 'not objectionable'. I subscribe to this view, but the empirical aspect is very remote, because it's too general for detail observation or experiment. Generality is the key to philosophy. |
19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Disputes like the vague one about 'the right conception of truth' occur in all domains where, instead of exact, scientific terminology, common language with its vagueness and ambiguity is used; and they are always meaningless, and therefore in vain. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 14) | |
A reaction: Taski taught a large number of famous philosophers in California in the 1950s, and this approach has had a huge influence. Recently there has been a bit of a rebellion. E.g. Kit Fine doesn't think it can all be done in formal languages. |
3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
Full Idea: If we reduce one theory to another, we reduce the number of independent assumptions about the world. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.215) |
19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
Full Idea: We must specify the words or concepts which we wish to use in defining the notion of truth; and we must also give the formal rules to which the definition should conform. More generally, we must describe the formal structure of the language. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 01) | |
A reaction: This, of course, is a highly formal view of how definition should be achieved, offered in anticipation of one of the most famous definitions in logic (of truth, by Tarski). Normally we assume English and classical logic. |
16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's Theorem states that under fairly generally applicable conditions, the assumption that there is a definition of truth within a given theory for the language of that same theory leads to a contradiction. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 1 | |
A reaction: That might leave room for a definition outside the given theory. I take the main motivation for the axiomatic approach to be a desire to get a theory of truth within the given theory, where Tarski's Theorem says traditional approaches are just wrong. |
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
Full Idea: In everyday language it seems impossible to define the notion of truth or even to use this notion in a consistent manner and in agreement with the laws of logic. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (works [1936]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int III | |
A reaction: [1935] See Logic|Theory of Logic|Semantics of Logic for Tarski's approach to truth. |
15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: Tarski's Theorem on the undefinability of truth says in a language sufficiently rich to talk about itself (which Gödel proved possible, via coding) the liar paradox can be carried out. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.2 | |
A reaction: The point is that truth is formally indefinable if it leads inescapably to contradiction, which the liar paradox does. This theorem is the motivation for all modern attempts to give a rigorous account of truth. |
19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The possibility of a consistent use of 'true sentence' which is in harmony with the laws of logic and the spirit of everyday language seems to be very questionable, so the same doubt attaches to the possibility of constructing a correct definition. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933], §1) | |
A reaction: This is often cited as Tarski having conclusively proved that 'true' cannot be defined from within a language, but his language here is much more circumspect. Modern critics say the claim depends entirely on classical logic. |
19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The desired definition of truth does not aim to specify the meaning of a familiar word used to denote a novel notion; on the contrary, it aims to catch hold of the actual meaning of an old notion. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 01) | |
A reaction: Tarski refers back to Aristotle for an account of the 'old notion'. To many the definition of Tarski looks very weird, so it is important to see that he is trying to capture the original concept. |
19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The main problem of the notion of truth is to give a satisfactory definition which is materially adequate and formally correct. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 01) | |
A reaction: That is, I take it, that it covers all cases of being true and failing to be true, and it fits in with the logic. The logic is explicitly classical logic, and he is not aiming to give the 'nature' or natural language understanding of the concept. |
19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The problem of the definition of truth obtains a precise meaning and can be solved in a rigorous way only for those languages whose structure has been exactly specified. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 06) | |
A reaction: Taski has just stated how to exactly specify the structure of a language. He says definition can only be vague and approximate for natural languages. (The usual criticism of the correspondence theory is its vagueness). |
19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
Full Idea: A time may come when we find ourselves confronted with several incompatible, but equally clear and precise, conceptions of truth. It will then become necessary to abandon the ambiguous usage of the word 'true', and introduce several terms instead. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 14) | |
A reaction: There may be a whiff of the pragmatic attitude to truth here, though that view is not necessarily pluralist. Analytic philosophy needs much more splitting of difficult terms into several more focused terms. |
16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's Theorem applies to any sufficient precise version of the correspondence theory of truth, and all the other traditional theories of truth. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 1 | |
A reaction: This is the key reason why modern thinkers have largely dropped talk of the correspondence theory. See Idea 16295. |
19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
Full Idea: It is a mistake to regard scheme (T) as a definition of truth. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 15) | |
A reaction: The point is, I take it, that the definition is the multitude of sentences which are generated by the schema, not the schema itself. |
15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: Tarski emancipated truth theory from traditional philosophy, by no longer posing Pilate's question (what is truth? or what is the essence of truth?) but instead 'how is truth used?', 'how does truth function?' and 'how can its functioning be described?'. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.2 | |
A reaction: Horsten, later in the book, does not give up on the essence of truth, and modern theorists are trying to get back to that question by following Tarski's formal route. Modern analytic philosophy at its best, it seems to me. |
16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski did not settle for a definition of truth, taking its adequacy for granted. Rather he proposed an adequacy criterion for evaluating the adequacy of definitions of truth. The criterion is his famous Convention T. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 | |
A reaction: Convention T famously says the sentence is true if and only if a description of the sentence is equivalent to affirming the sentence. 'Snow is white' iff snow is white. |
19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski does not tell us how to apply his concept of truth to a new case, whether the new case is a new language or a word newly added to a language. This is because enumerating cases gives no clue for the next or general case. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: His account has been compared to a telephone directory. We aim to understand the essence of anything, so that we can fully know it, and explain and predict how it will behave. Either truth is primitive, or I demand to know its essence. |
19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski defined the class of true sentences by giving the extension of the truth predicate, but he did not give the meaning. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: This is analogous to giving an account of the predicate 'red' as the set of red objects. Since I regard that as a hopeless definition of 'red', I am inclined to think the same of Tarski's account of truth. It works in the logic, but so what? |
4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Tarski's account doesn't hold for natural languages. The general notion of truth is replaced by "true-in-L", where L is a formal language. Hence truth is relativized to each artificial language. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is a pretty good indication that Tarski's theory is NOT a correspondence theory, even if its structure may sometimes give that impression. |
19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski has to define truths so as not to make explicit the relation between a true sentence and an obtaining state of affairs. ...He has to list each sentence separately, and simply assign it a state of affairs. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.8 | |
A reaction: He has to avoid semantic concepts like 'reference', because he wants a physicalist theory, according to Kirkham. Thus the hot interest in theories of reference in the 1970s/80s. And also attempts to give a physicalist account of meaning. |
10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
Full Idea: Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence, where a sequence is a set-theoretic individual, a set of ordered pairs each with a natural number as its first element and an object from the domain for its second. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 3 |
13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Statements of the form '"it is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' and '"the world war will begin in 1963" is true if and only if the world war will being in 1963' can be regarded as partial definitions of the concept of truth. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.404) | |
A reaction: The key word here is 'partial'. Truth is defined, presumably, when every such translation from the object language has been articulated, which is presumably impossible, given the infinity of concatenated phrases possible in a sentence. |
19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
Full Idea: For several reasons it appears most convenient to apply the term 'true' to sentences, and we shall follow this course. Consequently, we must always relate the notion of truth, like that of a sentence, to a specific language. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 02) | |
A reaction: Personally I take truth to attach to propositions, since sentences are ambiguous. In Idea 17308 the one sentence expresses three different truths (in my opinion), even though a single sentence (given in the object language) specifies it. |
19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
Full Idea: If we base ourselves on the classical conception of truth, we shall say that the sentence 'snow is white' is true if snow is white, and it is false if snow is not white. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 04) | |
A reaction: I had not realised, prior to his, how closely Tarski is sticking to Aristotle's famous formulation of truth. The point is that you can only specify 'what is' using a language. Putting 'true' in the metalanguage gives specific content to Aristotle. |
19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
Full Idea: In 'X is true iff p' if we replace X by the name of a sentence and p by a particular sentence this can be considered a partial definition of truth. The whole definition has to be ...a logical conjunction of all these partial definitions. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 04) | |
A reaction: This seems an unprecedented and odd way to define something. Define 'red' by '"This tomato is red" iff this tomato is red', etc? Define 'stone' by collecting together all the stones? The complex T-sentences are infinite in number. |
19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
Full Idea: We wish to use the term 'true' in such a way that all the equivalences of the form (T) [i.e. X is true iff p] can be asserted, and we shall call a definition of truth 'adequate' if all these equivalences follow from it. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 04) | |
A reaction: The interpretation of Tarski's theory is difficult. From this I'm thinking that 'true' is simply being defined as 'assertible'. This is the status of each line in a logical proof, if there is a semantic dimension to the proof (and not mere syntax). |
19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Semantic truth implies nothing regarding the conditions under which 'snow is white' can be asserted. It implies only that, whenever we assert or reject this sentence, we must be ready to assert or reject the correlated sentence '"snow is white" is true'. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 18) | |
A reaction: This appears to identify truth with assertibility, which is pretty much what modern pragmatists say. How do you distinguish 'genuine' assertion from rhetorical, teasing or lying assertions? Genuine assertion implies truth? Hm. |
15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
Full Idea: In Tarski's theory of truth, although the notion of truth is applicable only to closed formulas, to define it we must define a more general notion of satisfaction applicable to open formulas. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by John P. Burgess - Philosophical Logic 1.8 | |
A reaction: This is a helpful pointer to what is going on in the Tarski definition. It culminates in the 'satisfaction of all sequences', which presumable delivers the required closed formula. |
18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Tarski invoked the notion of a sentential function, where components are replaced by appropriate variables. A function is then satisfied by assigning objects to variables. An assignment satisfies if the function is true of the things assigned. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 3.2 | |
A reaction: [very compressed] This use of sentential functions, rather than sentences, looks like the key to Tarski's definition of truth. |
15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: The truth predicate, says Tarski, should be defined in terms of the more primitive satisfaction relation: the relation of being 'true of'. The fundamental notion is a formula (containing the free variables) being true of a sequence of objects as values. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 06.3 |
19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Tarski, a physicalist, reduced semantics to physical and/or logicomathematical concepts. He defined all semantic concepts, save satisfaction, in terms of truth. Then truth is defined in terms of satisfaction, and satisfaction is given non-semantically. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.1 | |
A reaction: The term 'logicomathematical' is intended to cover set theory. Kirkham says you can remove these restrictions from Tarski's theory, and the result is a version of the correspondence theory. |
19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Tarski's great insight is find another property, since open sentences are not truth. It must be had by open and genuine sentences. Clauses having it must generate it for the whole sentence. Truth can be defined for sentences by using it. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.4 | |
A reaction: The proposed property is 'satisfaction', which can (unlike truth) be a feature open sentences (such as 'x is green', which is satisfied by x='grass'), |
19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Tarski turned his axiomatic characterisation of satisfaction into an explicit definition of the satisfaction-predicate using some fancy set theoretical apparatus, and this in turn leads to the explicit definition of the truth predicate. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 7 |
19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
Full Idea: It turns out that the simplest and most natural way of obtaining an exact definition of truth is one which involves the use of other semantic notions, e.g. the notion of satisfaction (...which expresses relations between expressions and objects). | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 05) | |
A reaction: While the T-sentences appear to be 'minimal' and 'deflationary', it seems important to remember that 'satisfaction', which is basic to his theory, is a very robust notion. He actually mentions 'objects'. But see Idea 19185. |
19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
Full Idea: To define satisfaction we indicate which objects satisfy the simplest sentential functions, then state the conditions for compound functions. This applies automatically to sentences (with no free variables) so a true sentence is satisfied by all objects. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 11) | |
A reaction: I presume nothing in the domain of objects can conflict with a sentence that has been satisfied by some of them, so 'all' the objects satisfy the sentence. Tarski doesn't use the word 'domain'. Basic satisfaction seems to be stipulated. |
19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
Full Idea: In a 'semantically closed' language all sentences which determine the adequate usage of 'true' can be asserted in the language. ...We can't change our logic, so we reject such languages. ...So must use two different languages to discuss truth. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 08-09) | |
A reaction: This section explains why a meta-language is required. It rests entirely on the existence of the Liar paradox is a semantically closed language. |
19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Every sentence which occurs in the object language must also occur in the metalanguage, or can be translated into the metalanguage. There must also be logical terms, ...and semantic terms can only be introduced in the metalanguage by definition. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 09) | |
A reaction: He suggest that if the languages are 'typed', the meta-languag, to be 'richer', must contain variables of a higher logica type. Does this mean second-order logic? |
10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
Full Idea: Besides a theory of truth of his own, Tarski developed a theory of theories of truth. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.1 | |
A reaction: The famous snow biconditional is the latter, and the recursive account based on satisfaction is the former. |
17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
Full Idea: Tarski's analysis of the concept of 'truth' ...is given a precise treatment as a particular relation between syntax (language) and semantics (the world). | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.1 | |
A reaction: My problem is that the concept of truth seems to apply to animal minds, which are capable of making right or wrong judgements, and of realising their errors. Tarski didn't make universal claims for his account. |
10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
Full Idea: The Tarskian account of truth neglects the atomic sentences. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Mulligan/Simons/Smith - Truth-makers §1 | |
A reaction: Yes! The whole Tarskian edifice is built on a foundation which it is taboo even to mention. If truth is just the assignment of 'T' and 'F', that isn't even the beginnings of a theory of 'truth'. |
2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
Full Idea: Tarski says "we may remain naďve realists or idealists, empiricists or metaphysicians The semantic conception is completely neutral toward all these issues." | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Susan Haack - Philosophy of Logics 7.5 |
10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
Full Idea: Tarski work was to persuade physicalist that eliminating semantics was on the wrong track, and that we should explicate notions in the theory of reference nonsemantically rather than simply get rid of them. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Hartry Field - Tarski's Theory of Truth §3 |
10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
Full Idea: We need to add theories of primitive reference to Tarski's account if we are to establish the notion of truth as a physicalistically acceptable notion. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Hartry Field - Tarski's Theory of Truth §4 | |
A reaction: This is the main point of Field's paper, and sounds very plausible to me. There is something major missing from Tarski, and at some point there needs to be a 'primitive' notion of thought and language making contact with the world, as it can't be proved. |
10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
Full Idea: By similar standards of reduction to Tarski's, one might prove witchcraft compatible with physicalism, as long as witches cast only a finite number of spells. We merely list witch-and-victim pairs, with no mention of the terms of witchcraft theory. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 04) by Hartry Field - Tarski's Theory of Truth §4 |
19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski defined various predicates of the form 's is true in L', each applicable to a single language, but he failed to define a predicate of the form 's is true in L' for variable 'L'. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: You might say that no one defines 'tree' to be just 'in English', but we might define 'multiplies' to be in Peano Arithmetic. This indicates the limited and formal nature of what Tarski was trying to achieve. |
16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's proof of the definability of truth allowed him to establish truth as a respectable notion by his standards. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 |
16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Every really adequate theory of truth should also prove the law of non-contradiction. Therefore Tarski's notion of adequacy in Convention T fails to capture the intuitive notion of adequacy he is after. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 | |
A reaction: Tarski points out this weakness, in a passage quoted by Halbach. This obviously raises the question of what truth theories should prove, and this is explored by Halbach. If they start to prove arithmetic, we get nervous. Non-contradiction and x-middle? |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Tarski preferred an explicit definition of truth to axioms. He says axioms have a rather accidental character, only a definition can guarantee the continued consistency of the system, and it keeps truth in harmony with physical science and physicalism. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 2 n2 | |
A reaction: Davidson's summary, gleaned from various sources in Tarski. A big challenge for modern axiom systems is to avoid inconsistency, which is extremely hard to do (given that set theory is not sure of having achieved it). |
19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
Full Idea: We have to include the term 'true', or some other semantic term, in the list of undefined terms of the meta-language, and to express fundamental properties of the notion of truth in a series of axioms. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 10) | |
A reaction: It sounds as if Tarski semantic theory gives truth for the object language, but then an axiomatic theory of truth is also needed for the metalanguage. Halbch and Horsten seem to want an axiomatic theory in the object language. |
16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski preferred a definition of truth, but from that an axiomatisation can be extracted. His induction clauses can be turned into axioms. Hence he opened the way to axiomatic theories of truth. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 |
15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: Tarski's work is the earliest axiomatic theory of truth that meets minimal adequacy conditions. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 01.1 | |
A reaction: This shows a way in which Tarski gave a new direction to the study of truth. Subsequent theories have been 'stronger'. |
19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Truth can't be eliminated from universal statements saying all sentences of a certain type are true, or from the proof that 'all consequences of true sentences are true'. It is also needed if we can't name the sentence ('Plato's first sentence is true'). | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 16) | |
A reaction: This points to the deflationary view of truth, if its only role is in talking about other sentences in this way. Tarski gives the standard reason for rejecting the Redundancy view. |
19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Semantics as it is conceived in this paper is a sober and modest discipline which has no pretensions to being a universal patent-medicine for all the ills and diseases of mankind, whether imaginary or real. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 05) | |
A reaction: Written in 1944. This remark encourages the minimal or deflationary interpretation of his theory of truth, but see the robust use of 'satisfaction' in Idea 19184. |
19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Logical sentences are often assigned preliminary conditions under which they are true or false (often given as truth tables). However, these are outside the system of logic, and should not be regarded as definitions of the terms involved. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 15) | |
A reaction: Hence, presumably, the connectives are primitives (with no nature or meaning), and the truth tables are axioms for their use? This opinion of Tarski's may have helped shift the preference towards natural deduction introduction and elimination rules. |
10152 | Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski] |
Full Idea: People have asked me, 'How can you, a nominalist, do work in set theory and in logic, which are theories about things you do not believe in?' ...I believe that there is a value even in fairy tales and the study of fairy tales. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic | |
A reaction: This is obviously an oversimplification. I don't think for a moment that Tarski literally believed that the study of fairy tales had as much value as the study of logic. Why do we have this particular logic, and not some other? |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
Full Idea: No objective grounds are known to me which permit us to draw a sharp boundary between the two groups of terms, the logical and the non-logical. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (works [1936]), quoted by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §3 | |
A reaction: Musgrave is pointing out that this is bad news if you want to 'reduce' something like arithmetic to logic. 'Logic' is a vague object. |
13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
Full Idea: For a language, we must enumerate the primitive terms, and the rules of definition for new terms. Then we must distinguish the sentences, and separate out the axioms from amng them, and finally add rules of inference. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.402) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This lays down the standard modern procedure for defining a logical language. Once all of this is in place, we then add a semantics and we are in business. Natural deduction tries to do without the axioms. |
18812 | Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Tarski made a division of logical and non-logical vocabulary. He then defined a model as a non-logical assignment satisfying the corresponding sentential function. Then a conclusion follows logically if every model of the premises models the conclusion. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1936]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 3.2 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is Tarski's account of logical consequence, which follows on from his account of truth. 'Logical validity' is then 'true in every model'. Rumfitt doubts whether Tarski has given the meaning of 'logical consequence'. |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Tarski's 1936 definition of logical consequence is that in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true too (so that no model can make the conclusion false). | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Consequence 3 | |
A reaction: So the general idea is that a logical consequence is distinguished by being unstoppable. Sounds good. But then we have monotonic and non-monotonic logics, which (I'm guessing) embody different notions of consequence. |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Tarski's definition of logical consequence (1936) is that in a fully interpreted formal language an argument is valid iff under any allowed interpretation of its nonlogical symbols, if the premises are true then so is the conclusion. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by Wilfrid Hodges - Model Theory 3 | |
A reaction: The idea that you can only make these claims 'under an interpretation' seems to have had a huge influence on later philosophical thinking. |
13344 | X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the sentence X. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1936], p.417) | |
A reaction: [see Idea 13343 for his account of a 'model'] He is offering to define logical consequence in general, but this definition fits what we now call 'semantic consequence', written |=. This it is standard practice to read |= as 'models'. |
19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
Full Idea: With our definition of truth we can prove the laws of contradiction and excluded middle. These semantic laws should not be identified with the related logical laws, which belong to the sentential calculus, and do not involve 'true' at all. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 12) | |
A reaction: Very illuminating. I wish modern thinkers could be so clear about this matter. The logic contains 'P or not-P'. The semantics contains 'P is either true or false'. Critics say Tarski has presupposed 'classical' logic. |
18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
Full Idea: Tarski showed that the only binary relations invariant under arbitrary permutations are the universal relation, the empty relation, identity and non-identity, thus giving us a reason to include '=' among the logical terms. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Vann McGee - Logical Consequence 6 | |
A reaction: Tarski was looking for a criterion to distinguish logical from non-logical terms, since his account of logical validity depended on it. This idea lies behind whether a logic is or is not specified to be 'with identity' (i.e. using '='). |
10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
Full Idea: To say that the name x denotes a given object a is the same as to stipulate that the object a ... satisfies a sentential function of a particular type. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933], p.194) |
18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
Full Idea: Tarski discovered how to give a compositional semantics for predicate calculus, defining truth in terms of satisfaction, and showing how satisfaction for a complicated formula depends on satisfaction of the simple subformulas. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Vann McGee - Logical Consequence 4 | |
A reaction: The problem was that the subformulas may contain free variables, and thus not be sentences with truth values. 'Satisfaction' can handle this, where 'truth' cannot (I think). |
19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Tarski invented a formal semantics for quantified predicate logic, the logic of reasoning about mathematics. The heart of this great accomplishment is his theory of truth. It has been called semantic 'theory' of truth, but Tarski preferred 'conception'. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.1 |
13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Semantics is the totality of considerations concerning concepts which express connections between expressions of a language and objects and states of affairs referred to by these expressions. Examples are denotation, satisfaction, definition and truth. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.401) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, he notes that it 'is not commonly recognised' that truth is part of semantics. Nowadays truth seems to be the central concept in most semantics. |
13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
Full Idea: People have not been aware that the language about which we speak need by no means coincide with the language in which we speak. ..But the language which contains its own semantics must inevitably be inconsistent. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.402) | |
A reaction: It seems that Tarski was driven to propose the metalanguage approach mainly by the Liar Paradox. |
13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Here is a partial definition of the concept of satisfaction: John and Peter satisfy the sentential function 'X and Y are brothers' if and only if John and Peter are brothers. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.405) | |
A reaction: Satisfaction applies to open sentences and truth to closed sentences (with named objects). He uses the notion of total satisfaction to define truth. The example is a partial definition, not just an illustration. |
13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
Full Idea: It has been found useful in defining semantical concepts to deal first with the concept of satisfaction; both because the definition of this concept presents relatively few difficulties, and because the other semantical concepts are easily reduced to it. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.406) | |
A reaction: See Idea 13339 for his explanation of satisfaction. We just say that a open sentence is 'acceptable' or 'assertible' (or even 'true') when particular values are assigned to the variables. Then sentence is then 'satisfied'. |
13343 | A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions [Tarski] |
Full Idea: An arbitrary sequence of objects which satisfies every sentential function of the sentences L' will be called a 'model' or realization of the class L of sentences. There can also be a model of a single sentence is this way. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1936], p.417) | |
A reaction: [L' is L with the constants replaced by variables] Tarski is the originator of model theory, which is central to modern logic. The word 'realization' is a helpful indicator of what he has in mind. A model begins to look like a possible world. |
16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's distinction between object and metalanguage forms the basis of model theory. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 11 |
13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Using the definition of truth we are in a position to carry out the proof of consistency for deductive theories in which only (materially) true sentences are (formally) provable. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.407) | |
A reaction: This is evidently what Tarski saw as the most important first fruit of his new semantic theory of truth. |
8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
Full Idea: In Tarski's account of truth, self-reference (as found in the Liar Paradox) is prevented because the truth predicate for any given object language is never a part of that object language, and so a sentence can never predicate truth of itself. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic 03.I | |
A reaction: Thus we solve the Liar Paradox by ruling that 'you are not allowed to say that'. Hm. The slightly odd result is that in any conversation about whether p is true, we end up using (logically speaking) two different languages simultaneously. Hm. |
19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
Full Idea: In my judgement, it would be quite wrong and dangerous from the point of view of scientific progress to depreciate the importance of nhtinomies like the Liar Paradox, and treat them as jokes. The fact is we have been compelled to assert a false sentence. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 07) | |
A reaction: This is the heartfelt cry of the perfectionist, who wants everything under control. It was the dream of the age of Frege to Hilbert, which gradually eroded after Gödel's Incompleteness proof. Short ordinary folk panic about the Liar? |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: Tarski found an elegant new axiom system for Euclidean geometry that improved Hilbert's earlier version - and he formulated it without the use of set-theoretical notions. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Ch.9 |
10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski's theory of truth has been most influential in eventually creating a shift from the entirely syntactic way of doing things in metamathematics (promoted by Hilbert in the 1920s, in his theory of proofs), towards a set-theoretical, semantic approach. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int III |
4779 | For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: A dominant view, attributed mainly to Kim, is that events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Events: Mackie on causation [1971]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6 | |
A reaction: The obvious thought is that we might not describe something as an 'event' just because a property was exemplified (seeing red?). And WWII was an event, but a bit more than a 'property exemplification'. |
10369 | How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2 | |
A reaction: I don't actually buy the idea that an event could just be an 'exemplification'. Change seems to be required, and processes, or something like them, must be mentioned. Degrees of fine-graining sound good, though, for processes too. |
8976 | If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim] |
Full Idea: If Kim's events are just the ordered triple of | |
From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1 | |
A reaction: You might reply that the object, and maybe the attribute, are concrete, and the time is natural, but the combination really is an abstraction, even though it is located (like the equator). Where is the set of my books located? |
8975 | Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons] |
Full Idea: Kim's events cannot just be the ordered triple of | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1 | |
A reaction: Why should they even be in that particular order? This requirement rather messes up Kim's plan for a very streamlined, Ockhamised ontology. Circles have symmetry at all times. Is 'near Trafalgar Square' a property? |
8974 | Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons] |
Full Idea: Kim's events are exemplifications by an object of an attribute at a time...It does not make events basic entities, as the three constituents are more basic, but it gives identity conditions (two events are the same if object, attribute and time the same). | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1 | |
A reaction: [Aristotle is said to be behind this] I am more sympathetic to this view than the claim that events are primitive. If a pebble is ellipsoid for a million years, is that an event? I think the concept of a 'process' is the most fruitful one to investigate. |
8977 | Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim] |
Full Idea: Since some tautologously universal properties such as self-identity or being such that 2+2=4 apply to all things at all times, that is stretching Kim's events too far. Candidate properties need to be realistically restricted, and it is unclear how. | |
From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1 | |
A reaction: You could deploy Schoemaker's concept of natural properties in terms of the source of causal powers, but the problem would be that you were probably hoping to then use Kim's events to define causation. Answer: treat causation as the primitive. |
8980 | Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim] |
Full Idea: The criticism most frequently levelled against Kim's theory is that it results in an unacceptable plurality of finely differentiated events, because of the requirement for identity of the constituent property. | |
From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 4.4 | |
A reaction: This may mean that the Battle of Waterloo was several trillion events, which seems daft to the historian, but it doesn't to the physicist. A cannon firing is indeed an accumulation of lots of little events. |
2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: Examples where reductionism seems to give a good account of things are light, genes, temperature and transparency. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.025) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This a fairly simple examples, thoroughly confirmed by science a long time ago. Life is a nicer example, because it is more complex and less obvious, but pretty much beyond dispute these days. |
3536 | Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim] |
Full Idea: Each supervenient property necessarily has a coextensive property in the base family. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Concepts of supervenience [1984], §5) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the minimum requirement for a situation of supervenience. How do you decide which property is the 'base' property? Do we just mean that the base causes the other, but not vice versa? |
2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is customary to associate supervenience with the idea of dependence or determination. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.011) | |
A reaction: It is only 'customary' because, in principle, the supervenience might just be a coincidence. I might follow someone everywhere because I love them (dependence) or because they force me to (determination). There's always a reason. |
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
Full Idea: It is no part of supervenience that 'if p then q' entails 'if not p then not q'. To avoid such misunderstandings, it is common (though not more accurate) to describe supervenience in negative terms: no difference in A without a difference in B. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 5.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] In other words it is important to avoid the presupposition that the given supervenience is a two-way relation. The paradigm case of supervenience is stalking. |
2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
Full Idea: Mereological supervenience is the doctrine that wholes are fixed by the properties and relations that characterise their parts. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.018) | |
A reaction: Presumably this would be the opposite of 'holism'. Personally I would take mereological supervenience to be not merely correct, but to be metaphysically necessary. Don't ask me to prove it, of course. |
13745 | Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is a mistake, or at least misleading, to think of supervenience itself as a special and distinctive type of dependence relation, alongside causal dependence, mereological dependence, semantic dependence, and others. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Postscripts on supervenience [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: The point, I take it, is that supervenience is something which requires explanation, rather than being a conclusion to the debate. Why are statues beautiful? Why do brains generate minds? |
13746 | Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Supervenience itself is not an explanatory relation, not a 'deep' metaphysical relation; rather it is a 'surface' relation that reports a pattern of property covariation, suggesting the presence of an interesting dependency relation that might explain it. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Postscripts on supervenience [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: I think the underlying idea here is that supervenience appeals to the Humean view of physical laws as mere regularities, but it is no good for those who seek underlying mechanisms to explain the patterns and regularities. Humeans are wrong. |
3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
Full Idea: Supervenience opens up the possibility of a relationship that gives us determination, or dependence, without reduction (as beauty supervenes on physical properties, but can't be given a physical definition). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.223) | |
A reaction: Beauty is a bad analogy, since it rather obviously involves a beholder. There is nothing more to a statue than a substance of a certain shape. There are no good analogies for this sort of supervenience, because it doesn't exist. |
2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
Full Idea: A plausible criterion for distinguishing what is real from what is not real is the possession of causal power. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.119) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, a physicalist view, but for physicalists it is probably the best criterion of what is real. A standard objection to platonism in mathematics is that it denies mathematics causal powers. |
3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
Full Idea: Physicalists are fond of saying that physical facts determine all the facts. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.232) | |
A reaction: I totally agree with this slogan. As a view, it seems to me that it is reinforced by essentialism (see the ideas of Brian Ellis), which gives some indication of how facts are physically determined, and why there is no alternative. |
15456 | Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Kim suggest that 'extrinsic' properties are those that imply 'accompaniment' (coexisting with some wholly distinct contingent object), whereas 'intrinsic' properties are compatible with 'loneliness' (being un-accompanied). | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Psychophysical supervenience [1982], 9th pg) by David Lewis - Extrinsic Properties II | |
A reaction: The aim of Kim and Lewis is to get the ontological commitment down to a minimum - in this case just to objects (and mysterious 'implications'!). I like nominalism, but you can't just deny properties. 'Loneliness' is extrinsic! |
3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
Full Idea: Resemblance or similarity is the very core of our concept of a property. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.219) |
2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
Full Idea: Macroproperties can, and in general do, have their own causal powers, powers that go beyond the causal powers of their microconstituents. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.085) | |
A reaction: I don't see why the macro-powers 'go beyond' the sum of the micro-powers. Admittedly one molecule can't be slippery, but slipperiness can be totally reduced to molecule behaviour. |
3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Emergent properties are said to be irreducible to, and unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena from which they emerge (as weight is a 'resultant' property, but the transparency of water is an 'emergent' property). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.228) | |
A reaction: So weight is predictable, but transparency is a surprise? But presumably the transparency of water is totally predictable, once you understand it. Emergent properties are either dualist or reducible, in my view. |
3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
Full Idea: For the emergentist why pain emerges when C-fibres are excited remains a mystery (a 'brute fact'), but such properties then take on a life of their own as 'downward causation'. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.229) | |
A reaction: I don't think there are any 'brute facts', except perhaps at the lowest level of physics. Whatever happened to the principle of sufficient reason? Is the mind like God - a causal source which is uncaused? |
3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Arguably, properties must be individuated in terms of their causal powers. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.230) |
10151 | I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski] |
Full Idea: I am a nominalist. This is a very deep conviction of mine. ...I am a tortured nominalist. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int I | |
A reaction: I too am of the nominalist persuasion, but I don't feel justified in such a strong commitment. |
3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: For counterfactuals there is the 'nomic-derivational' approach (which logically derives them from laws), and the 'possible world' approach (based on truth in worlds close to the actual one). | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.141) by PG - Db (ideas) |
8825 | It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is agreed on all hands that the classical epistemological project, conceived as one of deductively validating physical knowledge from indubitable sensory data, cannot succeed. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (What is 'naturalized epistemology'? [1988], p.304) | |
A reaction: This is the 'Enlightenment Project', which had a parallel in morality. Kim refers to the difficulty as 'The Humean Predicament'. Hume also hoped that induction might be deductive. One obvious move is to expand from 'deduction' to 'reason'. |
530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
Full Idea: There are two contradictory arguments about everything. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B06a), quoted by (who?) - where? |
13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
Full Idea: Protagoras declares that it is possible to argue either side of any question with equal force, even the question whether or not one can equally argue either side of any question! | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998]) by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 088 | |
A reaction: This is perhaps the most famous sceptical argument in the ancient world (though, note, Protagoras is most famous for his relativism rather than his scepticism). It is, of course, wrong. The arguments are sometimes equal, but often they are not. |
2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
Full Idea: We do not agree that every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people. | |
From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B01) by Plato - Theaetetus 183c | |
A reaction: I fully agree with this, but only because I have an optimistic view that rational people converge on the truth. |
1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
Full Idea: Why didn't he start 'Truth' off by saying "A pig is the measure of all things", or "a baboon", or " tadpole"? That would have been a magnificently haughty beginning. | |
From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B01) by Plato - Theaetetus 161d1 |
14470 | Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim] |
Full Idea: The general principle of explanatory exclusion states that two or more complete and independent explanations of the same event or phenomenon cannot coexist. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion [1989], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a rather optimistic view of explanations, with a strong element of reality involved. I would have thought there were complete explanations at different 'levels', which were complementary to one another. |
3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is generally held that there are two broad categories of mental phenomena - qualitative states and intentional states (but what do they have in common?). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 23) | |
A reaction: I am happy to accept this orthodox modern analysis. Putting it more simply: minds exist to enable experience and thought. I judge a priori that the two aspects are not separate. Qualia exist to serve thought, and qualia are necessary for thought. |
3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
Full Idea: Unless mental properties have causal powers, there would be little point in worrying about them. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.118) | |
A reaction: This doesn't, on its own, actually rule out epiphenomenalism, but it does show why it barely qualifies as a serious theory. One might, in fact, say that we simply can't worry about something which has no causal powers. The powers might not be physical |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: The following all require a belief in mental causation: agency (mind causes events), knowledge (perception causes beliefs), reasoning (one belief causes another), memory (events cause ideas), psychology (science of mental causes). | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §2 p.031) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: A very good list, which I cannot fault, and to which I cannot add. The question is: is there any mental activity left over which does NOT require causation? Candidates are free will, and the contingent character of qualia. I say the answer is, no. |
3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Experimentation presupposes mental-to-physical causation and is impossible without it. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.128) | |
A reaction: So an epiphenomenalist can't do experiments? Kim implies that there is some special mental assessment of the feedback from physical events, but presumably a robot or a zombie could do experiments. Spiders do experiments. |
3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
Full Idea: A brief reflection makes it evident that most of our beliefs are generated by other beliefs we hold, and "generation" here could only mean causal generation. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.128) | |
A reaction: This seems right, and yet implies an uncomfortable determinism, as if all our beliefs just happened to us. I don't claim proper free will, but I do say there is an element in belief formation which is just caused by bunches of beliefs. Call it character. |
3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
Full Idea: Mental states are not the only things which exhibit intentionality - words and sentences can also refer to or represent facts or states of affairs. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 22) | |
A reaction: This points to Searle's distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'derived' intentionality (see Idea 3465). We must now explain the difference between verbal intentionality and non-verbal intentionality (both as phenomena, and as information). |
3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
Full Idea: There is referential intentionality (that some of our thoughts refer, or are 'about' something) and content intentionality (that propositional attitudes have content or meaning, often expressed by full sentences). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 21) | |
A reaction: So could these be the external and internal components of content? Which might be the causal/historical component, and the descriptive component? Which might be known by (indirect) acquaintance and description? |
2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
Full Idea: It seems to me inconceivable that a possible world exists that is an exact physical duplicate of this world but lacking wholly in intentionality. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101) | |
A reaction: Personally I can't conceive of such a world lacking qualia either. The physical entails the mental, say I. |
3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Are pains only sensory events, or do they also have a motivational component (e.g. aversiveness)? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 7) | |
A reaction: A nice question. Given the occasional genuine masochist, and the way some people love tastes that others hate, it has always seemed to me that aversiveness was not a necessary property of pain. I couldn't train myself to like pain, though |
3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
Full Idea: Some mental phenomena - in particular, sensations like tickles and pains - do not seem to exhibit either reference or content. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 21) | |
A reaction: This could be challenged. These sensations cannot be had without a bodily location, and they give information about possible contact or damage. |
3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
Full Idea: If inverted qualia, or absent qualia (zombies), are possible in functionally equivalent systems, qualia are not capturable by functional definitions. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.114) | |
A reaction: The point here (I take it) is that we don't have to go the whole hog of saying the qualia are therefore epiphenomenal, although that is implied. How about a fail-safe situation, where qualia do it for me, and something else does the same for zombies? |
3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: If you crosswire your 'pain box' and your 'itch box', the functionalist says you are in pain if the inputs and outputs are for pain, even though the feeling is of an itch. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.115) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: If functionalists would indeed say this, then the objection seems to me almost conclusive. But they might well say that such simple crosswiring won't work. Itching won't produce pain behaviour - it lacks the correct function. |
3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
Full Idea: Externalism about content would have the consequence that most of our knowledge of our own intentional states is indirect and must be based on external evidence. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.207) | |
A reaction: I think this is a confusion, endemic in discussions of externalism. If what Shakespeare meant by 'water' is H2O, or Putnam means by 'elm' what experts say, the point is that their meanings are NOT part of their intentional states, which are bookmarks. |
3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is not always easy for us to determine what emotion (or even physical sensations) we are experiencing. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 18) | |
A reaction: Confused sensations are, I would have thought, rare. Emotions, I think, are only confused when they are weak, and then a lot of the confusion is merely verbal. Our body and intuitions understand the feeling well enough, but we lack the vocabulary. |
3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
Full Idea: How do we know that we are angry rather than embarrassed? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.159) | |
A reaction: A very nice question, because the only answer I (or anyone?) can think of is that they are distinguished by their content. Event A is annoying, while event B is embarrassing. Either of those feelings is almost inconceivable without its content. |
3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
Full Idea: Since Cartesian dualism implies causation from outside of the physical domain, this means there can be no complete physical theory of the physical domain. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.147) | |
A reaction: This, I think, should be taken as a very strong argument against dualism, rather than as bad news for physics. Some exception might make the closure of physics impossible, but the claim that our brain is the exception looks highly suspect. |
3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
Full Idea: If epiphenomenalism were true, it would be a mystery how such things could be known to us. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.130) | |
A reaction: If a brain were asked whether it was conscious, it would presumably say 'yes', but (if epiphenomenalism were true) the cause of that would have to be brain events, and NOT information that it is conscious, which the brain could not have. Big objection. |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers doubt the coherence of the very idea of inverted or absent qualia. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.115) | |
A reaction: The possibility of inverted qualia with identical brain structures strikes me as nil, but it would be odd to deny that qualia could be changed by brain surgery, given that insects can see ultra-violet, and some people are colourblind. |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Is there anything about the qualitative characters of mental states which, should we come to know it, would convince us that zombies and qualia inversion are not really possible? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.171) | |
A reaction: The issue is what causes the qualitative states, not their 'characters'. This strikes me as falling into the trap of thinking that 'what it is like to be..' is a crucial issue. I think zombies are impossible, but not because I experience redness. |
3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Its inability to explain the possibility of "mental causation" doomed Cartesian dualism. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 4) | |
A reaction: This is a modern way of stating the interaction problem. Personally I am inclined to think that dualism was doomed by the spread of the scientific materialist view to every other corner of our knowledge except the mind. Plenty of causes baffle us. |
3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
Full Idea: Logical behaviourism says any meaningful statement about mental phenomena can be translated without loss of content into a statement solely about behavioural and physical phenomena. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 29) | |
A reaction: Also called analytical behaviourism. If we are supposed to infer the ontology of mental states from language, this makes me cross. Maybe we only discuss mentality in behavioural terms because we are epistemologically, and hence linguistically, limited. |
3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
Full Idea: Behaviourism can be considered as an attempt to reduce the mental to the physical via definitional bridge principles (every mental expression being given a behavioural definition). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.217) | |
A reaction: Effectively these would (if they had been discoverable) have been the elusive psycho-physical laws (which Davidson says do not exist). The objection to behaviourism is precisely that there is no fixed behaviour attached to a given mental state. |
3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Functionalists take a "realist" approach to dispositions whereas the behaviourist embraces an "instrumentalist" line. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 78) | |
A reaction: A helpful distinction, which immediately shows why functionalism is superior to behaviourism. There must be some explanation of mental dispositions, and the instrumental view is essentially a refusal to think about the real problem. |
3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Is there even a loosely definable range of bodily behaviour that is characteristically exhibited by people when they believe, say, that there is no largest prime number? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 32) | |
A reaction: This is a highly persuasive argument against behaviourism. Very abstract and theoretical thoughts have no related behaviour, especially among non-mathematicians. I probably believe this idea about numbers, but I can't think what to do about it. |
3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
Full Idea: Mind-to-behaviour connections are always defeasible - by the occurrence of a further mental state. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 35) | |
A reaction: But then an object's falling under gravity is always defeasible, by someone catching it first. This popular idea is meant to show that there could, as Davidson puts it, 'no psycho-physical laws', but I suspect the laws are just complex, like weather laws. |
3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
Full Idea: The factors that determine exactly what you are doing when you produce a physical gesture include the customs, habits and conventions that are in force, so it is unlikely that anyone could produce correct behavioural definitions of mental terms. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 36) | |
A reaction: This problem can be added to the problem that it is hard to specify behaviour without reference to mentalistic terms. The point is clearly right, as what I am doing when I wave my hand in the air will depend on all sorts of conventions and expectations. |
3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
Full Idea: If it is an analytic truth that anyone in pain has a tendency to wince or groan, what about snakes? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 37) | |
A reaction: Snakes do, however, exhibit what looks like 'I really don't like that' behaviour, and their rapid avoidance movements are identical to ours. On the other hand, I'm not quite sure what a snake does what it has a stomach upset. I see Kim's point. |
3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
Full Idea: Most neurons, it has been said, are pretty much alike and largely interchangeable. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 76) | |
A reaction: This fact, if true, is highly significant, because the correct theory of the mind must therefore be some sort of functionalism. If what a neuron is is insignificant, then what it does must be what matters. |
3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
Full Idea: Machine functionalism requires a mental state to be a physical realisation of a Turing machine; causal-theoretical functionalism only requires that there be appropriate "internal states". | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.112) | |
A reaction: Searle's objection to the Turing machine version seems good - that such a machine has an implicit notion of a user/interpreter, which is absent from this theory of mind. |
2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
Full Idea: There has been much scepticism about a functionalist account of intentionality, particularly from Putnam (recently) and Searle, but, like many others, I don't see any principled objections to such an account. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101) | |
A reaction: I agree. I don't believe that intentionality is a candidate for being one of those many 'magic' qualities which are supposed to make the reduction of mind to brain impossible. |
3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is by no means clear that any human could manage to do what Searle imagines himself to be doing in the Chinese Room - that is, short of throwing away the rule book and learning some real Chinese. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.100) | |
A reaction: It is not clear how a rule book could contain answers to an infinity of possible questions. The Chinese Room is just a very poor analogy with what is envisaged in the project of artificial intelligence. |
3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
Full Idea: On the functionalist account of mental properties, just where does a mental property get its causal powers? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.118) | |
A reaction: That is the key problem. Something can only have a function if it has intrinsic powers (corkscrews are rigid and helix-shaped). It can't be irrelevant that pain hurts. |
3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
Full Idea: The main obstacle to mind-body reduction is qualia. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.236) | |
A reaction: Personally I am also impressed by Leibniz's Mill (Idea 2109). No microscope could ever reveal the contents of thought. How can it be so vivid for the owner, but totally undetectable to an observer? |
3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
Full Idea: Most antireductionist arguments focus on the unavailability of bridge laws to effect the reduction of psychological theory to physical theory (as found in reducing the gas laws to theories about molecules). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.216) | |
A reaction: Reduction can, of course, be achieved by identity rather than by bridge laws. I would say that all that prevents us from predicting mental events from physical ones is the sheer complexity involved. Cf. predicting the detailed results of an explosion. |
2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is possible to hold that phenomenal properties (qualia) are irreducible, while holding intentional properties, including propositional attitudes, to be reducible (functionally, or biologically). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.017) | |
A reaction: This is the position which Kim has settled for, but I find it baffling. If the universe is full of irreducibles that is one thing, but if everything in the universe is reducible except for one tiny item, that is implausible. |
3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
Full Idea: The most widely accepted form of physicalism today is the nonreductive variety, ...which combines ontological physicalism with property dualism. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.212) | |
A reaction: I suspect that property dualism is actually in decline, but we will see. I have yet to find a coherent definition of property dualism. If being simultaneously red and square isn't property dualism, then what is it? Sounds like dualism to me. |
3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
Full Idea: In order to make sense of the empirical character of mind-brain identity, we must acknowledge the existence of phenomenal properties. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 66) | |
A reaction: Mind-brain identity is, of course, an ontological theory, not an epistemological one (like empiricism). I suspect that the basis for my belief in reductive physicalism is an intuition, which I am hoping is a rational intuition. Cf. Idea 3989. |
2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
Full Idea: The emergentism (of Searle), like ethical intuitionism, views mind-body supervenience as something that admits no explanation - it is a brute fact. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.013) | |
A reaction: This is why 'emergence' is no sort of theory, and is really old-fashioned dualism in a dubious naturalistic disguise. If mind 'emerges', there is presumably a causal mechanism for that. |
2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
Full Idea: If emergentism is correct about anything, it is more likely to be correct about qualia than about anything else. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.103) | |
A reaction: I'm puzzled by a view that says that nearly all of the mind is reducible, but one tiny aspect of it is 'emergent'. What sort of ontology is envisaged by that? |
2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
Full Idea: Maybe strong supervenience is inconsistent with the irreducibility of the supervenient properties to their subvenient bases. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.012) | |
A reaction: If two things are really very very supervenient on one another (superdupervenient?), then you have to ask WHY? If there isn't identity, then there is surely a highly lawlike connection? |
2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers saw in mind-body supervenience a satisfying metaphysical statement of physicalism without reductionism. This widely influential position is now known as "nonreductive physicalism". | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.008) | |
A reaction: If two things supervene on one another, then we should be asking why. Occasionalism and Parallelism are presumably not the answer. Coldness supervenes on ice. |
3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
Full Idea: The main argument for the physical supervenience of qualia, then, is the apparent conceivability of zombies and qualia inversion in organisms physically indistinguishable from us. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.171) | |
A reaction: Since neither zombies nor qualia inversion for identical brains seem to me to be even remotely conceivable, I won't trouble myself with the very vague concept of 'supervenience'. |
3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
Full Idea: If one accepts the supervenience of mental on physical, this logically implies that there can only be one Cartesian soul, because such souls are physically indiscernible, and hence mentally indiscernible. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 10) | |
A reaction: Not very persuasive. Brains are certainly discernible, and so are parts of brains. Egos might be mentally discernible. I don't find my notion of personal identity collapsing just because I espouse property dualism. |
3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
Full Idea: Token physicalism (as opposed to type physicalism) is a weak doctrine which simply says that any event or occurrence with a mental property has some physical property or other. It is not committed to reductionism. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 61) | |
A reaction: Sounds nice, but it seems incoherent to me. How can something have a physical property if it isn't physical? Try 'it isn't coloured, but has colour properties', or 'not a square, but with square properties'. 'Not divine, but divine properties' maybe. |
3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
Full Idea: From the emergentist point of view, the reductionists bridge laws are precisely what need to be explained. Why do these mental-physical correlations hold? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.229) | |
A reaction: Everyone is happy with the bridge laws from chemistry to physics, but no one knows (deep down) why those exact laws hold. We need to understand what consciousness is; its cause will then, I think, become apparent. |
3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
Full Idea: The two best know attempts to analyse away mental states are Armstrong's causal conception of such states (e.g. pain is a neural event caused by tissue damage), and Smart's 'topic-neutral translation'. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 67) | |
A reaction: Armstrong's view certainly seems to be missing something, since his 'pain' could do the job without consciousness. I take Smart's approach to be the germ of the right answer. |
3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
Full Idea: For the reductionist, no new causal powers emerge at higher levels, which goes against the claims of the emergentist and the non-reductive physicalist. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.232) | |
A reaction: I would say that all higher level causes are simply the sums of lower level causes, as in chemistry and physics. What could possibly produced the power at the higher level, apart from the constituents of the thing? Magic? |
3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
Full Idea: If reductionism goes, so does the intelligibility of mental causation. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.237) | |
A reaction: Quite so. Substance dualism turns mental causation into a miracle, but property dualism is really no better. If no laws connect brain and mind, you have no account. I don't see how 'reasons are causes' (Davidson) helps at all. |
2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
Full Idea: The two principle arguments which overthrew the mind-brain identity theory were the multiple realization argument of Hilary Putnam, and the anomalist argument of Davidson, which contained the seeds of functionalism and anomalous monism. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.002) | |
A reaction: The first argument strikes me as significant and interesting, but Davidson seems weak. It makes the unsubstantiated claim that mind is outside the laws of physics, and irreducible. |
2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
Full Idea: Multiple realization goes deeper and wider than biological species, and even in the same individual the neural realizer, or correlate, of a given mental state or function may change over time through maturation and brain injuries. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.095) | |
A reaction: The tricky question here is what you mean by 'change'. How different must a pattern of neurons be before you say it is of a different type? How do you individuate a type? |
2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
Full Idea: My doubts about functionalist accounts of qualia are based on the much discussed arguments from qualia inversions, and from epistemic considerations. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.102) | |
A reaction: With a colour inversion experience changes but function doesn't. But maybe function does change if you ask the right questions. 'Is this a warm colour?' It certainly strikes me that qualia contain useful (epistemic) information. |
3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
Full Idea: If an orange visual image is a brain state then, by the indiscernibility of identicals, some brain state must also be orange. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 64) | |
A reaction: I think this is the Hardest of all Hard Questions: how can I experience orange if my neurons haven't turned orange? What on earth is orangeness? I don't believe it is a 'microproperty' of orange objects; it's in us. |
3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
Full Idea: How do you find out that you believe, rather than, say, doubt or merely hope, that it will rain tomorrow? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.159) | |
A reaction: There should be a special medal created for philosophers who ask reasonable questions which are impossible to answer. They are among the greatest discoveries. |
2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
Full Idea: It has been customary to distinguish between two broad categories of mental phenomena, the intentional and the phenomenal, without excluding those that have both (e.g. emotions). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101) | |
A reaction: This has become the conventional modern account of the mind. It seems a little too simple to say that the mind is characterised by two clearcut phenomena like this. I suspect that his picture will be modified in time. |
3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
Full Idea: There is the "theory" theory of commonsense psychology, and also a "simulation" theory, which says it is not a matter of laws, but of simulating the behaviour of others, using ourselves as models. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.123) | |
A reaction: Using ourselves as models may be the normal and correct way to relate to people within our own culture, but we have to start theorising when we encounter (e.g.) suicide bombers. |
3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
Full Idea: A culture that lacked our folk psychology would be unintelligible to us, and its language untranslatable into our own. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.110) | |
A reaction: Surely we can manage to discuss the processing life of a robot, without having to resort to anthropomorphic psychology? Its human-style behaviour will fit, but the rest blatantly won't. |
3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
Full Idea: Freudian depth psychology has now almost achieved the status of folk psychology of the sophisticates. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.158) | |
A reaction: You don't need to be a 'sophisticate' to laugh knowingly when someone makes an embarrassing Freudian slip. Terms like 'neurotic' are commonplace among modern folk. |
3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
Full Idea: Commonsense psychology seems to have an advantage over scientific psychology: its apparent greater stability. Scientific theories seem to come and go. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.110) | |
A reaction: This seems to make the assumption that the folk are in universal long-term agreement about such things, which seems doubtful. See Ideas 2987 and 3410. |
3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
Full Idea: The Turing test is too tough, because something doesn't have to be smart enough to outwit a human (or even have language) to have mentality or intelligence. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 97) | |
A reaction: Presumably an alien with an IQ of 580 would also fail the Turing test. Indeed people of normal ability, but from a very different culture, might also fail. However, most of us would pass it. |
3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
Full Idea: The Turing test is too narrow, because it is designed to fool a human interrogator, but there could be creatures which are intelligent but still fail the test. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 97) | |
A reaction: I think the key test for intelligence would be a capacity for metathought. 'What do you think of the idea that x?' Their thoughts about x might be utterly stupid, of course. How do you measure 'stupid'? |
3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
Full Idea: States that have the same intrinsic properties - the same neural/physical properties - may have different contents if they are embedded in different environments. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.146) | |
A reaction: This is a way of expressing externalism. It depends what you mean by 'contents'. I struggle to see how "H2O" could be the content of the word 'water' among ancient Greeks. |
3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
Full Idea: The difference in the two types of 'water' in the Twin Earth experiment seem psychologically irrelevant, for behaviour causation or explanation. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.203) | |
A reaction: A rather important point. No matter how externalist you are about what content really is, people can only act on the internal aspects of it. |
3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is standard to take contents as truth conditions. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.203) | |
A reaction: This tradition runs from Frege to Davidson, and has been extended to truth conditions in possible worlds. Rivals will involve intentions, or eliminativism about meaning. |
3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
Full Idea: If content is said to be 'covariance' with something in the environment, then the belief that there are horses in the field covaries reliably with the presence of horses in the field, but also the presence of horse genes in the field. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.192) | |
A reaction: That's the end of that interesting proposal, then. Or is it? Looking at the field from a distance this is right, but down the microscope, the covariance varies. The theory lives on. |
3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
Full Idea: The example of someone claiming "arthritis in my thigh" shows that the content of belief depends, at least in part but crucially, on the speech practices of the linguistic community in which we situate the subject. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.197) | |
A reaction: Personally I find this social aspect to meaning to be more convincing that Putnam's idea that the physical world is part of meaning. It connects nicely with the social aspects of justification. |
3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
Full Idea: An objection to the 'covariance' theory of content is that what you believe is influenced, often crucially, by what else you believe. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.193) | |
A reaction: I can't think of a reply to this, if the covariance theory is suggesting that content just IS covariance of mental states with the environment. Externalism says that mind extends into the world. |
3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
Full Idea: No external factors seem to be required for Fred's belief that he is in pain, or that he exists, or that there are no unicorns. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.198) | |
A reaction: This is an extremely important observation for anyone who was getting over-excited about external accounts of content. Unicorns might connect externally to horns and horses. |
13345 | Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them [Tarski] |
Full Idea: A class of sentences can be called 'analytical' if every sequence of objects is a model of it. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1936], p.418) | |
A reaction: See Idea 13344 and Idea 13343 for the context of this assertion. |
3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
Full Idea: If someone says "I do and I don't like x", we do not take her to be expressing a literally contradictory belief. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.135) | |
A reaction: It might mean 'one minute I like it, and the next minute I don't', where there seems to be a real contradiction, with a time factor. You can't sustain both preferences with conviction. |
3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
Full Idea: We attribute to a subject beliefs that are obvious logical consequences of beliefs already attributed to him. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.135) | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'obvious'. Presumably they must be judged obvious to the believer, but only if they have thought of them. We can't believe all the simple but quirky implications of our beliefs. |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
Full Idea: Many have suggested alternative roles or sorts of reasons, which are not mandatory. Dancy says some reasons are 'enticing' rather than peremptory; Raz makes options 'eligible' rather than required; Gert says they justify rather than require action. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The third option is immediately attractive - but then it would only justify the action because it was a good reason, which would need explaining. 'Enticing' captures the psychology in a nice vague way. |
20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
Full Idea: Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or a dissatisfaction, ...where the object of such a satisfaction is called beautiful. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Elizabeth Schellekens - Immanuel Kant (aesthetics) 1 | |
A reaction: We usually avoid the word 'faculty' nowadays, because it implies a specific mechanism, but 'capacity' will do. Kant is said to focus specifically on beauty, whereas modern aestheticians have a broader view of the type of subject matter. |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
Full Idea: Final value is to be favoured for its own sake; personal value is to be favoured for someone's sake. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 7.2) | |
A reaction: This gives another important dimension for discussions of value. I like the question 'what gives rise to this value?', but we can also ask (given the value) why we should then promote it. Health isn't a final value, and truth isn't a personal value? |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
Full Idea: Examples of value-maker concepts are courageous, honest, cowardly, corrupt, elegant, tacky, melodious, insightful. Employing these concepts normally means both evaluating and describing the thing or person one way or another. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The point being that they tell you two things - that this thing has a particular value, and also why it has that value. Since I am flirting with the theory that all values must have 'value-makers' this is very interesting. |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
Full Idea: The '-able' concepts, such as valuable, enviable, contemptible, wear on their sleeve the idea that the thing so evaluated merits or is worth a certain attitude or response (of valuing, envying, despising). | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 18666. Hence some concepts point to the source of value in the thing, and others point to the source of the value in the normative attitude of the speaker. Interesting. |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
Full Idea: If a certain object is valuable, then something other than its being valuable must make it so. ...One is always in principle entitled to an answer as to why it is good or bad. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 5.2) | |
A reaction: What Orsi calls the 'chemistry' of value. I am inclined to think that this is the key to a philosophical study of value. Without this assumption the values float free, and we drift into idealised waffle. Note that here he only refers to 'objects'. |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
Full Idea: The whole 'being pleased by cats being tortured' is definitely not better, and is likely worse, than cats being tortured. So its value cannot result from a sum of the intrinsic values of the parts. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 5.3) | |
A reaction: This example is simplistic. It isn't a matter of just adding 'pleased' and 'tortured'. 'Pleased' doesn't have a standalone value. Only a rather gormless utilitarian would think it was always good if someone was pleased. I suspect values don't sum at all. |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
Full Idea: It is natural to assume that if we can compare two objects or states of affairs, X and Y, then X is either better than, or worse than, or as good as Y. This has been called the Trichotomy Thesis. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 6.2) | |
A reaction: This is the obvious starting point for a discussion of the difficult question of the extent to which values can be compared. Orsi says even if there was only one value, like pleasure, it might have incommensurable aspects like duration and intensity. |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
Full Idea: The main claims of the Fitting Attitude view of value are Reduction: values such are goodness are reduced to fitting attitudes, having reasons, and Normative Redundancy: goodness provides no reasons for attitudes beyond the thing's features. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Orsi's book is a sustained defence of this claim. I like the Normative Redundancy idea, but I am less persuaded by the Reduction. |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
Full Idea: A support for the fittingness account (against the buck-passing reasons account) is the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem. There are many reasons for positive attitudes towards things which are not good. We might admire a demon because he threatens torture. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I like the Buck-Passing view, but was never going to claim that all reasons for positive attitudes bestow value. I only think that there is no value without a reason |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
Full Idea: Many believe that final values can be extrinsic: objects which are valuable for their own sake partly thanks to their relations to other objects. ...This might depend on the value of other things...or an object's relational properties. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 2.3) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that virtually nothing (or even absolutely nothing) has final value in total isolation from other things (Moore's 'isolation test'). Values arise within a tangled network of relations. Your final value is my instrumental value. |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
Full Idea: My guiding assumption is that truths about value, at least, regularly entail normative truths of some sort about actions or attitudes. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Not quite as clear as it sounds. If I say 'the leaf is green' I presume a belief that it is green, which is an attitude. If I say 'shut the door' that implies an action with no value. One view says that values are entirely normative in this way. |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
Full Idea: Version two of the normative view of values is the Buck-Passing account, which says that 'x is good' means 'x has the property of having other properties that provide reasons to favour x'. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Scanlon 1998:95-8] I think this is the one to explore. We want values in the world, bridging the supposed 'is-ought gap', and not values that just derive from the way human beings are constituted (and certainly not supernatural values!). |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
Full Idea: Version one of the normative view of values is the Fitting Attitude account, which says that 'x is good' means 'it is fitting to respond favourably to (or 'favour') x'. | |
From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Brentano is mentioned. Orsi favours this view. The rival normative view is Scanlon's [1998:95-8] Buck-Passing account, in Idea 18670. I am interested in building a defence of the Buck-Passing account, which seems to suit a naturalistic realist like me. |
8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207) | |
A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little. |
3535 | All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim] |
Full Idea: All causal relations involving observable phenomena - all causal relations from daily experience - are cases of epiphenomenal causation. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation [1984], §2) |
3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
Full Idea: A widely but not universally accepted principle is that causally connected events must instantiate a law. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.133) |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience | |
A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!). |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'. |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me. |
3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
Full Idea: Some laws are held to be 'strict', and others involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.143) |
4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3 | |
A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is. |