Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Alistair Mitchell, Daniel Garber and Richard T.W. Arthur

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5 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber]
     Full Idea: The Epicurean atomists also defined body in terms of the property of being sensible, in order to distinguish it from empty space, which is not sensible.
     From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 1)
     A reaction: This is a very illuminating bit of background, for those of us who have the knee-jerk reaction that monadology is barking mad.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
     Full Idea: For Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, if a state of things is possible, it must occur at some time, whether past, present or future. For Leibniz possibility makes no reference to time; an individual is possible if its concept contains no contradiction.
     From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 4 'Contingent')
     A reaction: It has always struck me as fallacious to say that anything that is possible must at some time occur. If '6' is possible on the die, what will constrain it to eventually come up when thrown? Mere non-contradiction doesn't imply possibility either.
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A]
     Full Idea: Maybe we should say that IF regularities are stable, only then is induction a reliable procedure.
     From: Alistair Mitchell (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This seems to me a very good proposal. In a wildly unpredictable reality, it is hard to see how anyone could learn from experience, or do any reasoning about the future. Natural stability is the axiom on which induction is built.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R]
     Full Idea: The Jesuits rejected occasionalism ... because it is incompatible with the Catholic interpretation of the Eucharist, which there is genuine change of substance of the bread into the substance of Christ (transubstantiation).
     From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 5 'Substance')
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I take it that the Eucharist needs a real relation across the substance-spirit boundary, and not just a co-ordination.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Epicurean atoms are distinguished by their extreme hardness [Garber]
     Full Idea: In Epicurean atomism (of Cordemoy, for example) there is a world of basic things distinguished by virtue of their extreme hardness.
     From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 2)
     A reaction: Garber says that Leibniz espouses 'substantial atomism', which is different from this. Leibniz's atoms have active power, where these atoms just embody total resistance.