4 ideas
6627 | Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth [Stich, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some radical pragmatists, such as Stich, are ready to abandon the notion of truth. | |
From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.3 n18 | |
A reaction: Such a proposal strikes me as silly (unless the vacuum left by truth can be filled by something better than just the test of whether 'it works'). It currently strikes me that pragmatism has a sane wing (led by Peirce), and a mad wing. |
7295 | Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A] |
Full Idea: Maybe we should say that IF regularities are stable, only then is induction a reliable procedure. | |
From: Alistair Mitchell (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a very good proposal. In a wildly unpredictable reality, it is hard to see how anyone could learn from experience, or do any reasoning about the future. Natural stability is the axiom on which induction is built. |
4765 | Stich accepts eliminativism (labelled 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity [Stich, by Engel] |
Full Idea: Stich accepts a form of eliminativism (which he calls 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity generally. | |
From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §5.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the correct position for a Humean empiricist connectionist. Presumably he has some good reasons for eliminating rationality. |
4375 | Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg] |
Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation. | |
From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1) | |
A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings. |