13 ideas
9052 | Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: In a slogan, Unger's thesis is that all vague predicates lack application ('nihilism', says Williamson). Classical logic can be retained in its entirety. There are no borderline cases: for vague F, everything is not F; nothing is either F or borderline F. | |
From: report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by R Keefe / P Smith - Intro: Theories of Vagueness §1 | |
A reaction: Vague F could be translated as 'I'm quite tempted to apply F', in which case Unger is right. This would go with Russell's view. Logic and reason need precise concepts. The only strategy with vagueness is to reason hypothetically. |
16070 | There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman] |
Full Idea: Eliminativism is often associated with Unger, who defends 'mereological nihilism', that there are no composite objects (objects with proper parts); there are only mereological simples (with no proper parts). The nihilist denies statues and ships. | |
From: report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 4 | |
A reaction: The puzzle here is that he has a very clear notion of identity for the simples, but somehow bars combinations from having identity. So identity is simplicity? 'Complex identity' doesn't sound like an oxymoron. We're stuck if there are no simples. |
14759 | A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad] |
Full Idea: A thing is simply a long event, throughout the course of which there is either qualitative similarity or continuous qualitative change, together with a characteristic spatio-temporal unity. | |
From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], 10 'Duration') | |
A reaction: At least he is trying to give some sort of principle that links the stages of the event together. |
11842 | If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad] |
Full Idea: We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit. | |
From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13 | |
A reaction: Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light. |
14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
Full Idea: It is plainly contrary to common sense to say that the phases in the history of a thing are parts of the thing. | |
From: C.D. Broad (Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy [1933], I.349-50), quoted by Richard Cartwright - Scattered Objects n18 | |
A reaction: Nicely expressed! To suggest that me ten years ago is a mere part of some huge me, or that you are only talking to a part of me now, is a very long way indeed from normal usage. |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory. | |
From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises. |
8724 | The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that the meaning of 'know' changes from the courtroom to the living room and back again; no more than for supposing that 'vacuum' changes from the laboratory to the cannery. | |
From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], 2.1) | |
A reaction: I disagree. Lots of words change their meaning (or reference) according to context. Flat, fast, tall, clever. She 'knows a lot' certainly requires a context. The bar of justification goes up and down, and 'knowledge' changes accordingly. |
8722 | No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger] |
Full Idea: I argue for the thesis that no one ever knows about anything, ...and that consequently no one is ever justified or at all reasonable in anything. | |
From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], Intro) | |
A reaction: The premiss of his book seems to be that knowledge is assumed to require certainty, and is therefore impossible. Unger has helped push us to a more relaxed and fallibilist attitude to knowledge. 'No one is reasonable' is daft! |
8723 | An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger] |
Full Idea: The evil scientist might not only be deceiving you with his electrodes; maybe he has just created you with your ostensible memory beliefs and experiences, and for good measure he will immediately destroy you, so in the next moment you no longer exist. | |
From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], 1.12) | |
A reaction: This is based on Russell's scepticism about memory (Idea 2792). Even this very train of thought may not exist, if the first half of it was implanted, rather than being developed by you. I cannot see how to dispute this possibility. |
7295 | Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A] |
Full Idea: Maybe we should say that IF regularities are stable, only then is induction a reliable procedure. | |
From: Alistair Mitchell (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a very good proposal. In a wildly unpredictable reality, it is hard to see how anyone could learn from experience, or do any reasoning about the future. Natural stability is the axiom on which induction is built. |
8160 | The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Not only the present but also the past exist, but the future (so long as it is the future) does not. | |
From: report of C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923]) by Michael Dummett - Thought and Reality 1 | |
A reaction: This is quite appealing, and seems right if you believe that every truth has a truthmaker, and that there are no truths about the future. And yet the whole misery of people dying is that they cease to exist. |
14609 | We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad] |
Full Idea: One theory accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world. | |
From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II) | |
A reaction: This is now known as Broad's 'Growing Block' view of time. It is tempting to say that neither past nor future exist, but it seems undeniable that statements about the past can be wholly true, unlike those about the future. |
22933 | We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad] |
Full Idea: We imagine presentness moving, like the spot of light from a policeman's bulls eye traversing the fronts of houses in a street. What is illuminated is present, what was illuminated is past, and what is not yet illuminated is the future. | |
From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II) | |
A reaction: This is the 'moving spotlight' compromise theory, which retains the B-series eternal sequence of ordered events, but adds the A-series privileged present moment. Le Poidevin says Broad represents time twice over. |