14 ideas
10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: The most important (ontological) relations holding among truth-makers are the part and whole relations. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) | |
A reaction: Hence Peter Simons goes off and writes the best known book on mereology. Looks very promising to me. |
10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true, because sentences with more than one truth-maker would then be ambiguous, and 'a' and 'a exists' would have the same designatum. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: A 'moment' is an existentially dependent or non-self-sufficient object, that is, an object which is of such a nature that it cannot exist alone, ....... and we suggest that moments could serve as truth-makers. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §2) | |
A reaction: [These three writers invented the term 'truth-maker'] |
10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: A proposition may have a minimal truth-maker which is not unique, or a sentence may be made true by no single truth-maker but only by several jointly, or again only by several separately. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: Because of negative propositions, investigators of truth-makers have said that they are special non-objectual entities with a logical complexity, but we think a theory is possible in which the truth relation is tied to ordinary and scientific experience. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) |
10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: The correspondence theory of truth invokes a special category of non-objectual entities - facts, states of affairs, or whatever - simply to serve as truth-makers. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible. |
20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption. |
20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
Full Idea: There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty. |
20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
Full Idea: The leading claim of proponents of the a priori is that sources of justification are of two significantly different types: experiential and nonexperiential. Initially this difference is marked at the phenomenological level. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 5) | |
A reaction: He cites Plantinga and Bealer for the phenomenological starting point (that some knowledge just seems rationally obvious, certain, and perhaps necessary). |
20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
Full Idea: There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection. |
3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |
Full Idea: Some maintain that experiments in imagination are the source of a priori justification. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A priori/A posteriori [1992], p.1) | |
A reaction: What else could assessments of possibility and necessity be based on except imagination? |
20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
Full Idea: A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40) | |
A reaction: Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though. |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |